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A vast literature in law and political theory focuses on
questions of accountability and independence in democratic
government. Commentators tend to celebrate accountability in
the legislative and regulatory arenas, and independence in
the context of adjudication. Yet they largely ignore the government function that lies at the intersection of law-making and
law-application: enforcement. The gap in theory is reflected in
our current laws and institutional structures. When an
agency proposes a new regulation, we have rules in place to
promote political accountability, public participation, and neutral expertise in the regulatory process. When the same
agency adopts a new approach to enforcing the relevant statutes and regulations, however, we lack equivalent mechanisms for legitimating government action.
This Article seeks to fill that gap. Focusing on the civil
side of the civil/criminal divide, I develop a theory of enforcement that makes sense of its place in our system of government. Enforcement, I explain, connects law-making and
adjudication both in terms of how it operates—bringing cases
to adjudicators so that generally applicable laws may be interpreted and applied to particular individuals and firms—and in
terms of the features it shares with those more familiar modes
of governance. Enforcement is a form of discretionary policymaking, necessitating the same sorts of policy judgments
that characterize law-making, and triggering similar demands
for accountability, transparency, and public engagement. But
enforcers also must make individualized, retroactive, legal determinations of the sort we associate with judging, making the
strongest forms of popular control seem inapt.
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Drawing from democratic theory, I argue that the seeming
tension between accountability and independence can be resolved by understanding enforcement as a form of political
representation. Casting enforcement in this light helps reveal
the importance of accountability in the enforcement context,
while also making clear that enforcers can “represent” the
public without slavishly following the public will. To say that
public enforcement should be accountable is not to deny the
need for autonomous professional judgment, but to insist that
it is the responsibility of government to inform its citizens of
what it is doing in their name, and to listen to their views in
return. A call for accountability is also a call for mechanisms
by which citizens can attempt to influence enforcement prospectively, or “hold it accountable” retrospectively. And accountability to the public entails some measure of insulation
from narrow, private interests.
Our current treatment of enforcement falls far short of this
vision. As this Article shows, we have few tools to secure
meaningful political accountability for enforcement—but
neither do we have the means to shield enforcement from
improper influence. Under existing law, it turns out, enforcement is both too independent and not independent enough.
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INTRODUCTION
United States law and legal scholarship are fixated on
questions of democratic legitimacy. When government acts in
a legislative capacity, legitimacy is grounded in public accountability.1 Elections seem critical in this context, and indeed
legislators are elected at every level of our government.2 When
government acts in an adjudicative capacity, by contrast—interpreting and applying the law rather than enacting it—accountability typically is traded off against other values,
including independence.3 Elections are far more controversial
here, as the idea of making adjudicators responsive to popular
pressures sits uneasily with our vision of judging as something
distinct from ordinary politics.4
Far less attention has been devoted to the government
function that connects law-making and law-application: enforcement. U.S. governments (both state and federal) rely heavily on ex post enforcement to give effect to legal commands, to
translate the “law in books” into the “law in action.”5 In part for
that reason, in many areas we empower private citizens to participate in enforcement by bringing legal actions to vindicate
their rights.6 But enforcement is also a central occupation of
government. Every day, executive officials (again, both state
and federal) investigate possible violations and seek sanctions
in judicial or administrative proceedings. Commentators call
1

See infra Part I.
As one commentator put it, “[e]lections can occur without democracy, but
democracy cannot endure without elections.” DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS
1 (2002).
3
For an overview, see generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
4
See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability,
and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 910 (2007) (criticizing efforts “to
create the impression not only that courts are part of the political system, but also
that they and the judges who sit upon them are part of ordinary politics”).
5
See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12
(1910), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 39, 39–40 (William W. Fischer III,
Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993).
6
See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 7–8 (2010). Farhang uses the term “litigation state”
to refer to “private enforcement litigation,” which, he persuasively argues, should
be “regarded as a component of state capacity.” Id. This Article focuses on a more
literal version of the litigation state, in which the actual state uses litigation to
regulate its citizens.
2
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this “public enforcement”7—a term that simultaneously distinguishes enforcement by private actors and conveys, in shorthand, the familiar notion that government enforcement
represents the public interest.8
Despite its manifest importance, we lack a theoretical
framework for assessing the legitimacy of public enforcement,
or situating it in our broader scheme of democratic governance.
As a consequence, enforcement operates free of the protections
we have developed in other contexts to promote and manage
accountability in government. Consider the following:
•

Unlike proposed administrative regulations, which are
subject to requirements of public notice and comment,
enforcement policies are rarely disclosed—much less justified—publicly. For example, empirical work reveals
shifts in federal civil rights enforcement, from a focus on
racial discrimination to an emphasis on religious discrimination and back again.9 But, whereas new statutes or
regulations would be accompanied by lengthy explanation
and public debate, changes in enforcement policy often
are detectable only after the fact.10
• Unlike many regulatory actions, no formal process of centralized executive-branch review exists for general decisions about enforcement policy and priorities. Writing in
1977, then-Attorney General Griffin Bell complained that,
“[a]lthough I am the chief legal officer of the executive
branch, I have learned that I have virtually no control or
direction over the lawyers outside the Department of Justice, except indirectly in connection with pending litigation.”11 And, while there can be little doubt that federal
7
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 45 (2000).
8
See, e.g., John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or
Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (2005) (“A government enforcer is charged with promoting the public good . . . .”); William B. Rubenstein,
On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV.
2129, 2139 (2004) (“[I]t is a widely-utilized trope that private attorneys represent
individual clients with private interests while public attorneys represent the citizenry at large pursuing their public interest.”).
9
See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
10
See infra section III.A.1.
11
Griffin Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer
and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1978);
see also Carolyn B. Kuhl & John Roberts, Memo to the Attorney General on Areas
in Which Various Conservative Groups Have Suggested that the Department Take
Action (Mar. 15, 1982) (noting that “[c]onservatives complain that litigating decisions are not sufficiently monitored from Washington, with the result that overzealous or misinformed U.S. Attorneys bring lawsuits that do not comport with
the Administration program” and suggesting that “a centralized system for monitoring major litigation” might be established, or that federal litigation authority

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN402.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 5

DEMOCRATIC ENFORCEMENT?

11-MAY-17

14:09

933

enforcement changes with presidential administrations,
the President’s role in enforcement policy-setting is ad hoc
and largely hidden from view.12
• Unlike elected judges, many of whom are prohibited by
state law from personally soliciting campaign contributions and must recuse themselves from cases involving
campaign contributors, elected state attorneys general
(AGs) can and do solicit contributions from enforcement
targets and participate in investigations and enforcement
actions involving contributors.13 In one recent case, the
target of a multistate investigation complained of receiving
multiple requests for contributions from the offices of the
AGs involved in the action.14
• Unlike efforts to influence legislation and regulation, lobbying contacts with federal and state enforcers are largely
unregulated. Meanwhile, reports show that enforcers—
perhaps especially elected state AGs—are subject to a barrage of pressure from lobbyists seeking to influence their
enforcement decisions.15

The differential treatment of enforcement in areas of disclosure, oversight, elections, and lobbying reflects more than mere
inattention. It is also symptomatic of a more fundamental difficulty. Enforcement, I will argue, shares features with both
legislation and adjudication, making familiar notions of political accountability and responsiveness to the public will seem
simultaneously indispensable and alarming.
On the one hand, enforcement entails the sorts of policy
judgments that characterize legislation and regulation. No
might be centralized fully within the Department of Justice). Thanks to Steve
Burbank for bringing the Kuhl and Roberts memo to my attention.
12
See infra notes 153, 210–211 and accompanying text. Scholars have recently begun to consider questions related to presidential control of enforcement.
Although their work sometimes touches on accountability, that is not their focus.
These scholars consider only one potential source of accountability (the President), and they are interested in questions of presidential authority not directly
linked to accountability. See generally Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement
Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2013); Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Control
Across Agency Policymaking Forms, 43 FLA. St. L. REV. 21 (2015); Joseph Landau,
DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 619 (2012); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction
and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195 (2014); Zachary S. Price,
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014) [hereinafter Price, Enforcement Discretion]; Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65
Case W. L. REV. 1119 (2015) [hereinafter Price, Politics of Nonenforcement].
13
See infra notes 325–332 and accompanying text (describing rules limiting
judicial participation in cases involving campaign contributors).
14
See infra notes 137–140 and accompanying text (discussing the 5-Hour
Energy case).
15
See infra subpart IV.C.
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public enforcers—at least not in the U.S.—have the resources
to pursue every possible violation of the law. They have to pick
and choose, to set priorities and goals. These are policy questions through and through, and it seems not only inevitable but
appropriate that their resolution be “political” in some sense.
Accountability, then, surely is part of the enforcement story.
On the other hand, certain aspects of enforcement seem
more akin to adjudication than to legislation, making the
strongest versions of popular control appear inapt. Enforcement decisions are not just made at wholesale; in actual dayto-day practice, law enforcement is a retail endeavor. Having
determined to go after fraudsters, for example, enforcers must
then decide to pursue this offender or that one, to seek these
remedies or those. And, given that the overwhelming majority
of government enforcement actions are resolved through settlement rather than judicial decree, enforcers frequently decide
on outcomes as well as objectives.16 The individualized and
retroactive nature of enforcement distinguishes it from prospective, generally applicable legislation, and complicates the
answer to the accountability question. There is something decidedly uncomfortable in the notion that government’s choice
of enforcement targets—and of penalties in each case—should
be subject to public, or political, whim.
This Article develops a theory of accountability for civil law
enforcement that seeks to make sense of these competing perspectives. Enforcement, I explain, is a form of discretionary
policymaking with significant and often wide-ranging consequences for both regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries. Unlike enforcement by private actors, public
enforcement is designed—and expected—to serve the public
interest.17 Mechanisms of political accountability can help ensure that public enforcement performs its intended purpose,
and that it satisfies the basic democratic imperative that “those
potentially affected by a collective decision should have opportunities and capacities to influence that decision.”18
16
See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J.
515, 547–48 (2016) [hereinafter Lemos, Privatizing] (discussing the importance of
enforcer choices in a litigation landscape dominated by settlement).
17
See infra subpart II.A. To be sure, private enforcement may also serve the
public interest, either as an incidental effect of litigation that is inspired by purely
private interests, or because private litigants’ interests are themselves publicserving or altruistic in nature. See infra note 91 and accompanying text; Lemos,
Privatizing, supra note 16, at 529–30.
18
Laura Montanaro, The Democratic Legitimacy of Self-Appointed Representatives, 74 J. POL. 1094, 1094 (2012).
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It does not follow, however, that enforcers should be slaves
to public whim. Drawing from theories of political representation more generally, I argue that public enforcement can “represent” the public without parroting public opinion in every
case. Indeed, some measure of autonomy is essential if public
enforcement is to serve the public interest.
Thinking about enforcement as a form of political representation helps resolve the theoretical tension identified above,
demonstrating that accountability and independence can coexist in the enforcement context. But it also highlights the challenge of designing enforcement institutions in a way that
promotes accountability while preserving a role for independent, professional judgment. That is a gargantuan task, and
we are far from completing it.
As this Article demonstrates, existing rules and practices
render enforcement far less accountable than is commonly assumed. The various mechanisms we employ to give the public
a voice in law-making are at best weakened, and at worst
wholly inoperative, when government agencies enforce the law.
Making matters worse, we have done far too little to insulate
enforcement from the influence of narrow, private interests.
Though it has been largely ignored in the literature on capture,
I show that several features of enforcement make it particularly
susceptible to private influence. Here too, our conventional
solutions are largely unavailable. As noted above, few states
extend lobbying regulations to the enforcement context; such
rules apply to efforts to influence law-making, not implementation. Likewise, enforcement is often exempted from “sunshine”
requirements and other rules designed to promote transparency in government. And, although some civil enforcers
(the majority of state AGs) are elected, only glancing attention
has been paid to the question of how to regulate those elections—how to balance the quest for accountability with the
need to avoid bias and undue influence.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides some
necessary conceptual background, sketching the role that accountability plays in democratic governance and describing
how that role changes as we move from one government function to the next. Part II makes the normative case for accountability in the enforcement context. Parts III and IV turn from
theory to practice, revealing that public enforcement as currently constituted is neither adequately accountable to the
public, nor adequately sheltered from narrow private
pressures.
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Before proceeding, a few words on scope are in order. This
Article focuses on the civil side of law enforcement. I do not
address the work of criminal prosecutors or police. The reason
for that limitation tracks the intuition that animates the Article
as a whole: healthy accountability may mean something different from one context to the next, depending on the governmental function in question.19 Some criminal law scholars have
considered the accountability question for prosecutors, and I
draw from their work where appropriate.20 But, given the important differences between civil and criminal law enforcement,
theories that work on the criminal side do not necessarily
translate to the civil sphere.21 And even if our normative ideals
were the same for criminal and civil law enforcement, the
means we choose to secure those ends might be different.
Although this Article brackets criminal law, it considers
civil enforcement by the states as well as the federal govern19
Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 326 (2003) (stressing the need for functional and contextual
analyses of accountability and independence for courts).
20
For a sampling of recent work touching on problems of accountability for
criminal prosecutors, see Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 959 (2009); Daniel C. Richman,
Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA.
L. REV. 939 (1997); Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 S.M.U. L.
REV. 593 (2014); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 581 (2008); cf. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 (2015).
21
The consequences of civil and criminal law enforcement are different, as
are the purposes. Civil sanctions are primarily financial, whereas criminal sanctions can include a loss of liberty and trigger a cascade of collateral consequences.
Although criminal sanctions sometimes are financial in nature, we can still distinguish between civil and criminal fines based on the goal of the sanction and the
message it carries. Criminal sanctions carry a particular stigma, and their function may be to punish the defendant rather than to compensate the victim or deter
further wrongdoing. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
The criminal and civil contexts also differ in the sources and extent of enforcement discretion. Part of the story here is about politics. As countless others have
observed, the politics of crime control are starkly, perhaps uniquely, one-sided.
The result is that the scope of criminal law is pushed ever-wider—with a corresponding expansion of prosecutors’ discretion. Interest group pressures on the
civil side are more balanced, with regulated entities enjoying the upper hand in
many areas. That dynamic increases the potential for narrowly drawn civil statutes (or regulations) that leave relatively fewer policy questions in the hands of
enforcers. See infra section III.A.2.
Other aspects of the relevant institutional structures cut in the other direction, however, vesting more discretion in civil enforcers than their criminal-law
counterparts. For example, it is more common in the civil context for investigative
and “prosecutorial” functions to be combined in one entity rather than divided
across institutions (e.g., police department and district attorney’s office). The
consolidation of investigation and enforcement arguably increases the power of
enforcement agencies by removing a potential outside check.
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ment. It does so, in part, to illustrate the range of approaches
U.S. legal systems have taken to managing the relationship
between public enforcement and the public will. Such variation is not itself a bad thing. On the contrary, the optimal
contours of political accountability may differ from one jurisdiction to the next, depending on how each government conceives of the enforcement function. I return to this point in the
Conclusion. One thing is clear, however. Our current approaches to enforcement are far from optimal.
I
CHARTING ACCOUNTABILITY: WHY, TO WHOM, AND
FOR WHAT?
What role should notions of accountability, or responsiveness to the populace, play in civil enforcement? Under what
circumstances—if any—should public enforcers consciously
disregard public preferences? To answer these questions, we
first need to understand where enforcement, and accountability, fit in our system of government. This Part focuses on accountability; the body of the Article examines how the concepts
described here apply to enforcement.
A. Political Accountability and Representation
The size and scope of modern society makes direct democracy infeasible. Instead, the people govern via their political
representatives. It is through representation that the people
are made “present” in government.22 But of course the people
are not truly present; they are not doing the work of governance
themselves. This duality at the core of the concept of representation—the requirement that the people simultaneously be present and not present—has occupied generations of political
theorists. Yet the leading theories of representation share a
common core: for representatives to be “democratic,” they must
be authorized in some way by the people, to act on the people’s
behalf, and there must be some means by which the people can
hold their representatives accountable for their actions.23
Elections loom large in this framework.24 Elections enable
the people to select their representatives, and to reward or
22

See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 8–9 (1967).
See, e.g., Andrew Rehfield, Towards a General Theory of Political Representation, 68 J. POL. 1, 1–2 (2006) (discussing authorization and accountability as
indispensable to most conceptions of democratic representation).
24
See BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 6 (1997)
(“The central institution of representative government is election . . . .”); RICHARD
23
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sanction them for their conduct in office. And, because elections are recurring, they “allow[ ] voters to influence the decisions of their representatives” on an ongoing basis: “[A]t any
point in time it is in the interest of government to take into
account in its present decisions the future judgment of voters
on those decisions.”25 In this way, elections ensure that representative government is responsive to the interests of the
represented.26
But political accountability is not just about elections, or
anticipated sanctions—holding representatives to account.
Conventional definitions of accountability also suggest a critical role for explanation and justification—calling government to
account. Indeed, “[f]orcing people to explain what they have
done is perhaps the essential component of making them accountable. . . . [T]he core of accountability becomes a dialogue
between accountors and account-holders, using a shared ‘language of justification.’”27
Accountability, understood to entail both holding to account and calling to account, promotes various democratic values. As a conceptual matter, political accountability is
constitutive of political representation; it makes it possible to
talk about government “by the people.”28 More instrumentally,
accountability is a means to an end—a way of ensuring that
government representatives stay “on the virtuous path,” acting
in the interests of the people.29 Accountability also fosters
MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 41
(2003) (“In a representative democracy, the core accountability mechanism is the
general election, at which an incumbent government presents itself to the citizens
and seeks a renewal of its mandate to govern.”); PITKIN, supra note 22, at 234
(“[W]e tend to feel that [representative government] is impossible without
elections.”)
25
MANIN, supra note 24, at 175, 178.
26
See, e.g., Nadia Urbinati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation
in Contemporary Democratic Theory, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 387, 389 (2008) (explaining that on the “standard account” of representative democracy, “electoral
mechanisms ensure some measure of responsiveness to the people”).
27
See MULGAN, supra note 24, at 9 (internal citations omitted); see also Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental to Democracy 5 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14–13, 2014), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2410812 [https://perma.cc/F5GE-34YE]) (arguing that “it goes to the
essence of the political relationship . . . for the people to demand an account [from
government]”).
28
See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532–33 (1998) (describing the conventional view).
29
See MANIN, supra note 24, at 117 (describing Madison’s view of frequent
elections as the “most effectual precaution to keep [representatives] virtuous”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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democratic citizenship by encouraging public deliberation
about and participation in governance.30
For all these reasons, political accountability is central to
most accounts of representative democracy, “the sine qua non
of legitimacy in government action.”31 Yet it does not follow
that all government action must be accountable, or accountable in the same way or to the same extent. To begin with, it is
essential to distinguish between different types of accountability. Accountability is a relational concept; it is meaningless
unless one specifies to whom the relevant actor is accountable.
As the discussion so far should make clear, my focus here is on
political accountability—accountability of government to the
people. Political accountability can be direct, as in the case of
elected officials. It can also be indirect, or mediated, as in the
case of political appointees.32 That is, if the relevant actors are
not themselves elected, they may answer to elected officials, or
their conduct may be controlled in various ways by representative forces.33 In either case, the key—definitionally speaking—
is that the “account holder” is the people themselves.34
The more difficult question concerns the appropriate balance between goals of accountability, representation, and responsiveness, on the one hand, and complementary values of
30
See MULGAN, supra note 24, at 12–13 (“Accountability forces members of
the government into dialogue with their citizens and therefore contributes directly
to the ongoing debate about the public good which advocates of deliberative
democracy identify as the essential feature of a democratic society.”).
31
Brown, supra note 28, at 532.
32
See, e.g., MULGAN, supra note 24 at 31 (“Political accountability can . . .
include accountability both within the executive branch to the president as well
as to Congress and to sections of the public at large.”).
33
Waldron, supra note 27, at 14 (noting that “accountability in modern democracies is often mediated,” as where a civil servant answers to a supervisor who
answers to an elected official, who in turn answers to voters).
34
For purposes of this Article, therefore, I bracket questions of “administrative” or “bureaucratic” accountability, which concern hierarchical controls within
government institutions (for example, the “accountability” of a line officer to her
supervisor). MULGAN, supra note 24, at 35 (“[I]n the United States, the accountability of officials to the president and Congress is well described as political while
their accountability to each other may be seen as bureaucratic or professional.”).
That is not to deny the practical importance of such forms of accountability. One
might sensibly conclude that the realities of contemporary political life render
meaningful political accountability a “myth,” making administrative accountability the only viable option. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the
Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2134–36 (2005). Before
embracing that descriptive claim in the context of enforcement, however, we first
should ask the normative question: what role should the public play in public
enforcement? Armed with a theory of why political accountability might be valuable for enforcement, we can then assess the efficacy of our existing mechanisms of
accountability. If administrative accountability turns out to be the only game in
town, at least we will know whether that is a feature or a bug.
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independence, expertise, and predictability on the other.
American democracy has never pursued political accountability to the exclusion of all else. Instead, the balance shifts depending on the government function in question.
B. The Accountability-Independence Tradeoff
Accountability tends to hold pride of place in the legislative
context,35 reflecting the democratic principle that “all affected
by collective decisions should have an opportunity to influence
the outcome.”36 Because legislation is generally applicable, it
is “impracticable” that everyone affected by a law “should have
a direct voice in its adoption.”37 We the People participate in
the legislative process through our representatives, and our
“rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a
complex society, by [our] power, immediate or remote, over
those who make the rule.”38 Political accountability is therefore enshrined in the federal and state constitutions, which
carefully prescribe methods for popular elections of legislators.
As we have seen, elections “are at the core of the American
political system,” at least where legislation is concerned.39 A
central goal of elections, in turn, “is to accurately register the
preferences of the relevant electorate.”40
Adjudicative proceedings are subject to a very different set
of norms. In adjudication, due process requires that the affected individuals have notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard.41 Due process also demands that
government officials who perform adjudicative tasks be neutral
35
Even in the legislative realm, accountability is tempered by an impulse
toward independence. See, e.g., John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz,
Democratic Rulemaking, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 9) (on file with authors) (“[T]he U.S. Constitution contains many
elements designed to resist responsiveness to transitory shifts in majority preferences: for example, a challenging amendment procedure; a core separation of
powers structure; and a bicameral legislature, with the Senate acting as ‘an
anchor against popular fluctuations’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James
Madison))).
36
Urbinati & Warren, supra note 26, at 395.
37
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
38
Id.
39
RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 1 (1980)
(“[Elections] are the way we choose government leaders, a source of government’s
legitimacy, and a means by which citizens try to influence public policy.”).
40
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601,
608 (2007).
41
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(“[T]here can be no doubt that at a minimum [due process] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”).
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and impartial—favoritism toward one or the other party is disqualifying, and outside influences are strictly curtailed.42 Unlike legislators, adjudicators are not supposed to be responsive
to popular preferences. We expect judges to “apply the law
without fear or favor”43 and, when necessary, to “stand up to
what is generally supreme in a democracy: the popular will.”44
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]his requirement of
neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of
participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.”45
This neat dichotomy between legislation and adjudication
is far too simple, of course. As countless others have observed,
the lines between legislation and adjudication are blurry at
best.46 Legislation may be narrowly drawn, targeting identifiable individuals and groups.47 And, particularly where adjudicative decisions are subject to stare decisis, the decisions in
individual cases may have wide-ranging, prospective effects. In
our post-Realist world, we know that adjudicators do more
than apply existing law in a mechanical, pre-political way.48
Adjudicators often have no choice but to make law—sometimes
provoking accusations of “legislating from the bench.”49
Despite these complications, the distinction between legislation and adjudication remains central to our legal system.

42

See Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980).
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).
44
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1180 (1989).
45
Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242.
46
See, e.g., JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES 16–21 (1927) (problematizing the litigation/adjudication divide); Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV.
259, 260–65 (1938) (same).
47
For extended discussions of “special legislation” and arguments for a requirement of legislative generality, see Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQUETTE L. REV. 625 (2014); Evan C. Zoldan, Privilege and
Punishment: A Failure of Equal Protection (Jan. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
48
See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered
Statutes and the Non-Delegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 423–40 (2008)
(discussing judicial lawmaking and the influence of the Realists).
49
See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 188–89 (2007) (examining claims that judges
“legislate from the bench”).
43
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Nowhere is this more clear than in the administrative state.50
Administrative agencies have provoked nearly endless scholarly handwringing and debate by combining legislative and adjudicative functions in a body that is neither quite as
accountable as a legislature nor quite as independent as a
court. Although agencies have the power to enact regulations
that operate much like legislation, they are not subject to the
same democratic checks as elected legislators. This institutional structure, scholars have argued, “presents a serious legitimacy problem: How can we ensure the democratic
responsiveness of the unelected administrative bureaucracy?”51 Agency adjudications present a different kind of legitimacy problem because administrative adjudicators lack the
insulation we typically associate with judges. How can we ensure the fairness and neutrality of a judge who works for the
same agency that is acting as regulator and prosecutor?52
Alan Morrison sums all of this up in one pithy sentence:
“Administrative agencies are just like legislatures and courts—
except when they’re not.”53 Notice what is missing from this
picture, however: enforcement. Agencies do not just make
rules and adjudicate disputes. They also act as enforcers.
Agencies conduct investigations, choose targets, and initiate
enforcement proceedings in judicial or administrative venues.
Yet enforcement has inspired far less attention than rulemaking or adjudication. Like other agency functions that fall
outside those better-known boxes, enforcement is simply “committed to agency discretion” and left largely unregulated.54
Enforcement is also remarkably under-theorized. Notwithstanding all the attention that has been heaped on questions of
democratic accountability and decisional independence when
50
See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (5th ed. 2009) (describing
the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication as “perhaps the most critical distinction in all of administrative law”).
51
Sidney Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 580
(2011).
52
The Administrative Procedure Act responds to this challenge by
“separat[ing] adjudication from other agency functions in the interest of fairness,
walling it off from ‘[p]ressures and influences properly enough directed toward
officers responsible for formulating and administering policy.’” Daniel A. Farber &
Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV.
1137, 1143 (2014) (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 3 (1945)).
53
Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and
Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 80 (2007).
54
See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 454
(1986).
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government regulates or adjudicates, we lack equivalent theories for enforcement. This Article seeks to fill that gap.
II
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE IN PUBLIC
ENFORCEMENT
To the extent that commentators have focused on accountability for civil law-enforcement, they have used it as a means
of comparison. Accountability is a key feature distinguishing
public enforcement—that is, enforcement that is controlled by
the government—from litigation by private plaintiffs and attorneys.55 Private parties may purport to represent the public
interest in enforcement actions, but the representation is, at
best, virtual. Critics emphasize that “neither the citizens
bringing private enforcement suits nor the judges who decide
them are subject to electoral discipline.”56 By contrast, these
same critics assert, government agencies “are accountable to
the electorate . . . through the President and, more indirectly,
through congressional oversight.”57 Thus, the argument goes,
“private enforcement may undermine a valuable democratic
feature of American governance.”58
The critique of private enforcement assumes, as a positive
matter, that public enforcers are accountable to “the people” in
some meaningful way; and, as a normative matter, that they
ought to be. But the assumptions are just that—assumptions.
Rarely does anyone pause to ask whether public enforcers re55
See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123
YALE L.J. 616, 637–38 (2013) (describing a common line of critique of private
enforcement that “proceeds from a . . . basic pair of observations: public enforcers
are politically accountable actors. Private enforcers are not.”).
56
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 119
(2005).
57
Id.; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of
Private Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996) (arguing that “some combination of congressional and presidential oversight” ensures that public enforcement does not “stray[ ] too far from the balance point that conforms with the
preferences of the electorate”).
58
Stephenson, supra note 56, at 119; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or
Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENV. L. &
POL’Y FORUM 39, 49 (2001) (arguing that private enforcers “face no significant
political repercussions for setting unwise enforcement policies”); Harold J. Krent
& Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1793, 1801–04 (1993) (critiquing private rights of action on grounds of accountability, and arguing that “[t]he desideratum of accountability . . . militates for
executive involvement in enforcing all laws passed by Congress”); Pierce, supra
note 57, at 12 (criticizing private rights of action for “lack of political accountability for important policy decisions”).
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ally are accountable; or whether, and to what extent, they
should be.
This Part develops a theory of accountability for public enforcement. Using an analogy to lawmaking, subpart A begins
by making the normative case for accountability. Subpart B
complicates the picture by likening enforcement to adjudication and highlighting the difficulties with a system of enforcement that simply channels public opinion. Subpart C proposes
a framework for reconciliation. The key move is to think about
public enforcement, not in isolation, but as one of the ways our
government governs us. If the familiar notion that public enforcement “represents” the public interest means anything, I
argue, it must refer to a form of political representation. Democratic theorists long have wrestled with questions about the
optimal relationship between government and the public will,
and their answers are enlightening for enforcement. Understanding enforcement as political representation makes clear
that public preferences do have a role to play in shaping public
enforcement. In areas (or on issues) where citizens are engaged
and well informed, it becomes difficult to argue that an official
is representing them if her actions are consistently at odds with
their preferences. But in the many areas where citizens are
uninformed or uninterested, a representative may be justified
in going against their wishes.
A. The Case for Accountability
In the three-branch model of American government, enforcement is the province of the executive.59 Article II of the
federal Constitution obligates the President to “take [c]are that
the [l]aws be faithfully executed”—a function that all agree includes enforcement.60 Article II also contains detailed provisions for elections, plainly contemplating that the President
will answer to the people.61 The President, in turn, oversees
the operation of the administrative state, including enforcement. Though scholars continue to debate whether the President is empowered to direct agency action, there is no doubt
that he or she has the power to appoint and remove top agency
officials, and at least to oversee administrative policy.62
59

Heckler v. Cheney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
61
Id. § 1.
62
Debates over the “unitariness” of the federal executive are longstanding.
See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) (“Whether the founders framed a strongly unitary
executive, or whether we should continue to recognize what they framed, is not a
60
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In most states, enforcement authority resides in the attorney general, who typically is elected independently.63 The provisions for direct election of the states’ chief enforcers—
sometimes called “the [p]eople’s [l]awyer[s]”64—might suggest
that the case for accountability and popular control is stronger
at the state level. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that many
state constitutions also provide for the election of judges.65 As
recent cases have made clear, it does not follow from the fact of
elections that judges must be accountable to the people in
precisely the same way, and to the same degree, as other
elected officials.66 While elections provide a floor, they leave
ample room to balance responsiveness and autonomy.67 For
example, it is coherent to say that elected judges ought to respond to public pressures when dealing with some kinds of
decisions but not others.68 So, too—perhaps—for elected AGs.
In short, the federal and state constitutions put accountability squarely in the frame for enforcement, but provide little
guidance on where to draw the line between healthy accountability and undue influence. Rather than pondering accountability in the abstract, we need to ask, accountability for what?
What do we want political accountability to accomplish in the
context of public enforcement? Thinking about enforcement
new debate.”). Compare, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 594–96 (1994) (arguing
that the President alone holds the executive power and thus that he can control or
act in the place of agency officials), with Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The
Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 698
(2007) (defending the “oversight” view). On the appointment and removal powers,
see infra notes 179–91 and accompanying text.
63
See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
64
JIM MATTOX, TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE PEOPLE’S LAWYER, THE MATTOX
ADMINISTRATION, 1983-1990, at 86 (1990) (suggesting that attorneys general “have
only one client—the people, or the state” and referring to the office as the “People’s
Lawyer”).
65
See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of
Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1063–64 (2010).
66
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1673, 1668 (2015) (“A State’s
decision to elect judges does not compel it to compromise public confidence in
their integrity.”).
67
See Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The Endangered
Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1232 (2008) (“[U]nlike other political contests, judicial elections must strike a balance between assuring that judges are accountable and
protecting their ability to be fair and independent.”).
68
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial
Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH, supra note 3, at 9, 29 (“There are reasons to think that appellate courts,
whose primary concern is legal questions (and as one moves to high courts, legal
questions in which policy looms large), should—as a normative matter—be more
tied to public opinion than trial courts.”).
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and accountability in more instrumental terms can help identify where accountability is most needed, and most worrisome.
As this subpart explains, functional considerations make a
powerful case for accountability. Enforcement can be understood as a form of policymaking, and enforcers—both public
and private—have significant discretion in their choices as to
both means and ends. What distinguishes public enforcement
from the private analogue is the promise that government can
and will seek to vindicate the broad public interest, rather than
focusing enforcement on private objectives. Measures designed to secure meaningful accountability for public enforcement would give the people an opportunity to shape
enforcement undertaken in their name, and reinforce the link
between public enforcement and the public interest.
1. Enforcement as Discretionary Policymaking
Why do we rely on government officials to enforce the law?
This question may seem elementary, but it is critical. We have
seen that the optimal balance between independence and accountability shifts from one governmental function to the next.
To understand accountability in the enforcement context, then,
we first have to understand enforcement.
Begin with the functions of enforcement, generally. Enforcement can, of course, compensate victims and otherwise
redress the harms wrought by illegal conduct. But the more
fundamental social purpose of enforcement is deterrence.69 By
uncovering and sanctioning legal violations, enforcement
forces violators to internalize the costs of their conduct and so
deters further misconduct by defendants and similar actors.
The optimal level of deterrence (and, thus, of enforcement)
will depend on the terms of the relevant law and the available
sanction.70 Where laws are carefully drafted and sanctions
match harm, complete deterrence may be warranted, and enforcers should pursue every violation. In many areas, however,
optimal deterrence is less than complete.71 Perhaps the law
captures conduct that is not really harmful or that cannot be
69
See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private
and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 582 (1997)
(“The social benefits of suit inhere in the deterrent effect that suit has on the
exercise of precautions by injurers and thereby on the frequency of harm.”).
70
For a succinct explanation of the optimal deterrence approach, see Max
Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 853, 859–61 (2012).
71
Adler, supra note 58, at 62 (“Optimal enforcement is nearly always less
than complete enforcement.”).
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deterred efficiently.72 Or perhaps the available sanction
swamps any actual harm.73 In such circumstances, we rely on
enforcers to practice “discretionary nonenforcement”—to
choose their battles and, where appropriate, pull their
punches.74
Enforcement, therefore, is an important form of policymaking. Enforcement may not make law in a formal sense, but—
whether public or private—enforcement profoundly shapes the
“law in action.”75 And in most cases, enforcement entails a
substantial element of discretion, as enforcers have to determine whether to proceed against any given violation, and if so,
what sanctions to seek.76
The policy-laden nature of enforcement—and the connection to lawmaking—is even more obvious when enforcers make
generalized decisions about what types of offenses to prioritize
or ignore. The Obama Administration’s deferred-action programs offer recent examples. In 2012 and again in 2014, President Obama announced that immigration officials would
exercise their “prosecutorial discretion” to grant “deferred action”—that is, a temporary reprieve from deportation—to certain immigrants who otherwise might be subject to
enforcement actions.77 The announcements came on the heels
72
See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343,
1365 (2013) (emphasizing concerns about over-enforcement in areas where “the
law is vague or overbroad”); Shavell, supra note 69, at 582–83 (discussing situations where “suit is excessive” because “there is no deterrent effect of suit”).
73
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1975) (describing risks of over-enforcement where
sanctions exceed the social cost of illegal activity).
74
Id. at 38–41.
75
Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
698, 699 (2011); accord Andrias, supra note 12 at 1045–46.
76
See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Congressional Competition to Control
Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1453 (2003) (“[A]gencies usually retain
significant enforcement discretion even when Congress carefully delineates their
substantive mandates. In practical terms, agencies frequently determine the extent to which a law will be binding, and upon whom.”); Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1201, 1231–32 (2012) (“[E]nforcement inherently necessitates some measure of
discretion, requiring decisions to be made about how and when laws should be
enforced.”).
77
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 138–41 (2015). For transcripts of the announcements, see
Remarks by the President on Immigration, White House Office of the Press Secretary (June 15, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/
15/remarks-president-immigration [http://perma.cc/M4P3-9ZGY] (announcing
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, which applies to undocumented immigrant children who were brought to the U.S. by their parents); Remarks by the
President in Address to Nation on Immigration, White House Office of the Press
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of Congress’s failure to enact proposed legislation that would
have accomplished largely the same goals.78 Critics argued
that the programs constituted an abdication of the President’s
duties under the Take Care Clause, and also violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural requirements for
rulemaking.79 Though vigorously defending the legality of the
deferred-action programs, the President was forthright about
what prompted them: “[T]o those members of Congress who
question my authority . . . or question the wisdom of me acting
where Congress has failed, I have one answer: Pass a bill.”80
Consider a different example, involving an affirmative enforcement initiative rather than a policy of nonenforcement. In
his recent book on civil enforcement by state AGs, political
scientist Paul Nolette describes coordinated efforts by AGs to
change the way the pharmaceutical industry sets prices for
prescription drugs, and how it advertises them.81 Working together through multistate litigation, like-minded AGs took aim
at, and ultimately disrupted, settled industry practices such as
direct-to-consumer advertising and the marketing of off-label
uses. The litigation resembled regulation in both purpose and
effect.82 As Nolette emphasizes, “[t]he policies created through
multistate settlements have included several that industry critics had proposed in Congress but never successfully navigated
the legislative process. . . . The settlement provisions were also

Secretary (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov.the-press-office/2014/
11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [http://perma.cc/TTE7Y2DG] [hereinafter 2014 Remarks] (announcing Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans, which grants temporary relief to law-abiding parents of U.S. citizens
and certain lawful permanent residents).
78
For a history and defense of the programs, see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note
77, at 130–42.
79
See generally, e.g., Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II:
Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 199, 219 (2015) (characterizing Obama’s immigration policies as “flout[ing] the duties imposed by the Take
Care Clause”); Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred
Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1227–37
(2015) (arguing that the programs require notice-and-comment rulemaking under
the APA); Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 12, at 757, 759–61 (arguing
that Obama’s “immigration policy appears difficult to square with a proper conception of executive duty”). Both claims were presented in a suit by twenty-six
states seeking to enjoin the programs. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146
(5th Cir. 2015). The court of appeals agreed with the states, and its decision was
affirmed by an evenly divided Supreme Court. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct.
2271 (2016) (per curiam).
80
2014 Remarks, supra note 77.
81
PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL 43–87 (2015).
82
See id. at 23.
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a direct response to the FDA’s deregulatory posture toward
drug marketing.”83
These examples illustrate the functional similarities between regulation and enforcement: the two forms of agency
action will sometimes be alternate means to the same end. If
an agency wants to adjust the regulatory status quo in some
way—to impose a new demand on regulated entities, for example—it can amend the relevant regulations or it can ramp up its
enforcement efforts.84 As a practical matter, the consequences
for regulated parties may be largely indistinguishable, particularly where enforcement results in orders or agreements requiring the defendant to change its behavior going forward. As one
AG put it, “[a]ttorneys general can do more damage in a heartbeat than legislative bodies can.”85 This feature of enforcement
has inspired the label, “regulation-by-litigation”—a pejorative
used to call into question the legitimacy of particular enforcement initiatives.86
2. The Promise and Peril of Public Enforcement
The critique of enforcement as regulation-in-disguise is by
no means limited to public enforcement; it extends with equal
force to enforcement by private parties and private attorneys.
But, while both public and private enforcement have the capacity to move policy, they may not move it in the same direction.
Because public and private enforcers differ in various respects,
we can expect them to exercise their discretion in different
ways, to pursue different targets and prioritize different
goals.87 These differences go to the heart of why We the People
83

Id. at 80.
See Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2069, 2126
(2015) (“In many cases, actions labeled as ‘enforcement’ decisions really are substantive regulatory decisions.”).
85
Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 28, 2014) (quoting Colorado AG John W. Suthers) http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/us/lobbyists-bearing-gifts-pursue-attorneysgeneral.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/WW9L-2NFP].
86
ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 48 (2009) (“The final
outcome of regulation-by-litigation looks an awful lot like . . . regulation-byrulemaking: a set of detailed rules that constrain future behavior.”)
87
For recent discussions of the differences between public and private enforcement, see, for example, Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 661–71 (2013); David Freeman Engstrom, Private
Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1913, 1924–43 (2014) [hereinafter Engstrom, Pathways]; Lemos, Privatizing,
supra note 16, at 524–30. Seminal works include Gary S. Becker & George J.
Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1974); Landes & Posner, supra note 73; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private
Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).
84
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rely on public enforcement as we do, and highlight the need for
accountability.
Most accounts of private litigation begin from a common
premise: private enforcement is fueled by the financial incentives of litigants and their lawyers.88 On that view, a plaintiff
will sue if, and only if, her expected recovery exceeds the costs
of litigation.89 Likewise, a private attorney will take a case if,
and only if, the expected payoff exceeds the cost.90 To be sure,
commentators sometimes acknowledge that private litigants
may be motivated by goals other than money—goals such as
revenge, a desire to be heard, or to have one’s “day in court.”91
Like the financial interests that dominate most accounts, however, these non-financial interests share a common characteristic: they are personal, individualized, private.92
At least since Steven Shavell’s famous article describing
the “fundamental divergence between the private and the social
motive to use the legal system,” it has been taken as gospel in
the enforcement literature that private litigation may promote
private interests at the expense of the public interest.93 Public
enforcement is different—or at least it can be. Public enforcement agencies are not for-profit businesses; they need not
break even in every case, much less maximize recoveries. Government attorneys are salaried, and their annual take-home is
not connected in any immediate way to the quantity or quality
of cases they choose to pursue, or the size of the judgments
they recover.94
88
See, e.g., Engstrom, Pathways, supra note 86, at 1924 (noting the centrality of “[a]ssumptions about the essential profit motivation of private enforcers”).
89
See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782,
796–98 (2011) (describing the conventional economic litigation model).
90
See id. at 790.
91
E.g., Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
19–23 (2000) (discussing litigants’ noneconomic motives).
92
See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2200 (2010) (“By definition, a
private enforcer is incentiv[iz]ed to maximize her private welfare. . . .”). The selfinterested nature of private enforcement should not be overstated. Among other
things, the conventional account ignores the important strand of private litigation
known as “public interest law,” which (as the name suggests) understands itself
as serving the public interest and typically is not for profit. Attention to public
interest lawyering makes clear that there is nothing inherent in the nature of
private enforcement that requires that it turn on narrow self-interest, much less
financial interest. But public interest lawyering accounts for only a small fraction
of the private legal market. Most private enforcement can be explained by the
private incentives emphasized on the conventional account.
93
Shavell, supra note 69, at 581.
94
See Landes & Posner, supra note 73, at 15 (“[T]he public enforcer is not
constrained to act as a private profit maximizer.”).
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Government attorneys also serve different kinds of clients
than their counterparts in the private bar. The clients in public
enforcement actions typically are government officials and institutions who are themselves bound to serve the public interest.95 And, in some cases, the only “client” is the public itself.96
When a state attorney general decides to pursue litigation seeking to redress some harm to the state’s citizens, for example,
there is no agency to act as intermediary between the public
and the attorney. The attorney acts in the name of the state
and its citizens, and her obligation is to the public generally.
Thus, while public enforcers, like their private counterparts, must weigh the expected costs and benefits of every
enforcement action, their considerations are different—or at
least they can be. Whereas private enforcers focus on private
costs and benefits, public enforcers can take account of the
broader social consequences of the case, including costs and
benefits to defendants, third parties, and the system as a
whole.97 Public enforcement, in other words, can represent the
public interest.
Perhaps this is all that needs to be said to make the case
for accountability for public enforcement. Private litigation will
not dependably serve the public interest; some interests will be
left out. We need some way for the public itself to be represented in enforcement. Yet it seems plain that the “representation” will not be in the nature of the traditional lawyer-client
relationship. As with law-making, it is impracticable for the
whole of the people to band together to pursue litigation. Nor
can we collectively monitor and instruct an attorney, or replace
her midstream if we disapprove of her litigation choices. Instead, if the government is to represent us in enforcement, the
representation must be political. As Part I explained, political
95
Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 269 (2000) (“Whether one views the client as the
government, a government agency or a government official, the client is distinctive
in at least this respect: the client owes fiduciary duties to the public.”); Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 2138 (“Many public attorneys . . . consider ‘the public’ or
‘the public interest’ as their real client in interest; the agency or government
official to whom they report is simply an intermediary form of that principal.”).
96
See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 83 (Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013) [hereafter NAAG] (explaining that, in various areas, AGs “have been given independent enforcement duties
to advance and to protect ‘the public interest’ through litigation”).
97
See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should,
and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789
(2000) (“It is an uncontroversial proposition in mainstream American legal
thought that government lawyers have greater responsibilities to pursue the common good or the public interest than their counterparts in private practice . . . .”).
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representation typically demands political accountability. That
is, this sort of institutional arrangement—with government actors engaging in discretionary policymaking in service of the
public—triggers the “basic normative intuition that lies at the
heart of most contemporary democratic theories: those potentially affected by a collective decision should have opportunities
and capacities to influence that decision.”98
The argument becomes stronger still if we consider the
realities of public enforcement, acknowledging that various
forces can skew public enforcement away from the pursuit of
the public interest. Like other government functions, public
enforcement may be diverted by enforcement officials’ own selfinterest, or by narrow private interests.99
Commentary on the tradeoffs between public and private
enforcement often emphasizes the risk that government attorneys may prioritize cases that advance their personal or professional interests.100 Public “attorneys, like most people,
recognize that their job performance today affects their career
opportunities tomorrow.”101 The consequences are hard to
predict. Depending on their personal preferences and career
plans, attorneys may relish the challenge of high-profile cases
that are likely to garner attention,102 or they may prefer to
focus on smaller cases that are easy to win and that will fly
below the political radar.103 The important point for present
98
Montanaro, supra note 18, at 1094; cf. Wright, supra note 20, at 581
(“When government officials have discretion, the rule of law also requires that they
be accountable.”).
99
Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 496 (2003) (emphasizing
concerns about “the corrupting forces that the constitutional structure is designed to inhibit: private interest and governmental self-interest”).
100
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. ReV. 505, 543 (2001) (noting that, “with the absence of direct political accountability,” federal prosecutors may prefer “prosecutions that further the prosecutor’s
own professional development, or prosecutions that are especially interesting or
fun”).
101
Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in
United States Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants,
23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 277 (2002).
102
See JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE
POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 74, 204 (1978) (reporting that Assistant U.S. Attorneys who anticipated moving into private practice tended to prefer complex, highprofile cases); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 812 (1999) (describing
U.S. Attorneys’ offices as “way stations for lawyers seeking to advance their careers with conspicuous litigation victories against well-represented targets”).
103
See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The
Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1444–45 (1998)
(describing how career government attorneys tend toward uncontroversial cases).
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purposes is that there is no necessary connection between the
self-interest of enforcement officials and the public interest in
effective enforcement.
The risk that enforcement will be skewed by private influence is at least as strong, though it has received less attention.
In the context of law making—and particularly administrative
regulation—concerns about private influence have inspired various mechanisms designed to minimize the risk that government will be “captured” by organized interests.104 The concept
of capture is notoriously slippery, but a good working definition
understands capture as “the result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed
away from the public interest and toward the interests of the
regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry
itself.”105 Early analyses of capture tended to focus on the
potential for over-regulation, but more recent scholarship has
emphasized the corollary risk of so-called “corrosive” capture,
whereby “organized firms render regulation less robust than
intended in legislation or than what the public interest would
recommend.”106
The emphasis on regulation in these definitions is not mere
happenstance. Most commentary on capture focuses on the
government’s law-making functions, downplaying enforcement.107 Yet several features of enforcement make it especially
susceptible to capture, particularly of the “corrosive” type.
Enforcement actions frequently reflect an asymmetric pattern, with the costs of enforcement falling on a narrow band of
defendants and the benefits shared widely by the “inattentive
public.”108 That pattern facilitates capture. Well-known collective action problems make it hard for large groups to organize, particularly when the costs (or benefits) to each individual
104
See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (discussing mechanisms to
reduce agency capture).
105
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO
LIMIT IT 13 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) [hereinafter PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE].
106
Id. at 16.
107
For an exception, see Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory
Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81,
126–31 (2002).
108
Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127
HARV. L. REV. 853, 879 (2014) (“Enforcement is often invisible to those who benefit
from it—in public choice terms, enforcement typically works to the advantage of
the ‘inattentive public[ ].’” (quoting R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 68 (1990))).
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are negligible.109 Smaller groups can organize more easily, and
they have ample incentive to try to influence government action
that affects them directly.110
Enforcement power also tends to be held, at least in the
first instance, by specialized agencies as opposed to generalists.111 For a variety of reasons, generalist institutions tend to
be less susceptible to capture than specialists. By definition,
generalist institutions deal with a range of issues, which means
that they hear from a range of interests. The resulting
cacophony makes it difficult for any one interest to wrest control of the institution’s decision making. Special interests also
get less bang for their buck with generalists, because even if
they are successful, the benefits of capture “are diluted by the
wide range of matters that are of no concern to a particular
special-interest group.”112 Specialized agencies, by contrast,
deal with the same issues over and over, meaning that they
consistently interact with the same set of players.113 From an
interest-group perspective, that structure both reduces the
costs and increases the benefits of capture.114
Finally, capture may be especially difficult to detect in the
context of enforcement. In order for any claim of capture to
make sense, it is not enough to identify government action that
aligns with a certain interest (e.g., that of the regulated industry). One must also identify the counterfactual: the public interest that the institution in question is not serving.115 That is
hard to do in the best of times, but it is particularly challenging
when dealing with discrete enforcement decisions. Even if one
can identify the public interest at the level of platitude—“it is in
the public’s interest to promote competition”—it is extraordinarily difficult to show that the public interest would be better
served by the agency going after one defendant rather than
another, or seeking this remedy rather than that one.
Not only does this feature of enforcement make it difficult
to spot capture when it happens, but it also makes it easier for
would-be defendants to persuade public enforcers to look the
109

See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
110
See generally THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
111
See infra section III.A.1.
112
Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture,
and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1362 (2013).
113
See id. at 1341.
114
See Minzner, supra note 84, at 2136–59 (describing special risks of capture
for specialized enforcers).
115
See Daniel Carpenter, Detecting and Measuring Capture, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 105, at 57, 58.
AND THE
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other way in their cases. As recent commentary has emphasized, the risks of capture may be pronounced in circumstances where government officials can tell themselves that
they are doing the right thing. “Most corrupt acts don’t take
the form of clearly immoral choices. People fight those.”116 Yet
even officials who embrace their duty to serve the public interest may be swayed by the “soft pressures” of so-called “cultural,”117 “social,”118 and “informational”119 capture. Officials
acting in good faith “might depend on information from the
affected entities and lack the means or ability to review that
information skeptically. Or the agency might come to see the
world the way that its regulated entities do.”120 The upshot is
that government officials, including enforcers, “might make decisions because their conception of the public interest has been
colonized by industry.”121 Notably, those decisions often will
also serve the self-interest of government enforcers.122 As suggested above, government attorneys may hope to secure postgovernment employment in the regulated industry, or they may
prefer to avoid particularly difficult and contentious cases that
threaten to eat up time and effort with no guarantee of success.
Enforcers likewise may be anxious to please their overseers
with impressive statistics of cases won and settlements secured. For all these reasons, battling a powerful and highly
motivated defendant may seem decidedly unattractive.123 In
such circumstances, well-meaning enforcers may be swayed by
116
Steve Randy Waldman, Sympathy for the Treasury, INTERFLUIDITY (Nov. 5,
2009), http://www.interfluidity.com/posts/1257407150.shtml [http://
perma.cc/N5QP-KWYE]; see James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial
Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 105, 71, 94 (“Most regulators probably do not see themselves as trading influence for material gain.”).
117
Kwak, supra note 116, at 93.
118
Steven M. Davidoff, The Government’s Elite and Regulatory Capture, N.Y.
TIMES, (June 11, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-govern
ments-elite-and-regulatory-capture [http://perma.cc/HPR7-WF5D] (“These men
and women may believe they are doing their best, but their worldview is affected
by the people they interact with.”).
119
Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010).
120
Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1 (Nov. 20,
2010).
121
Kwak, supra note 116, at 79.
122
See id. at 75 (explaining that “[t]he motive force in traditional theories of
capture is material self-interest” and discussing how self-interest may interact
with other, more subtle and less rational influences).
123
See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 108, at 890 (“[F]or enforcement lawyers
who do not intend to move on [to private practice], simple cases with small penalties may be more attractive than riskier cases with potentially larger rewards.”).
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claims that the hardest cases, or the strongest sanctions,
would not actually promote the public interest.
This analysis suggests that the risk of capture in the enforcement context is real, and worthy of study in its own right.
It also serves to underline the functional importance of accountability for public enforcement. Accountability can tether
public enforcement to the public interest. That is, accountability can help ensure that public enforcers do indeed focus on the
full social consequences of enforcement, rather than emphasizing the more narrow, parochial, and financial concerns that
dominate private enforcement. Political accountability is not
the only means to that end, of course. Ethical and professional
rules compel attorneys to work in service of their clients’ interests, and—as noted—the relevant “client” for government attorneys is often the public itself.124 Bureaucratic controls,
including office policies and norms, can help reinforce that
focus.125 But institutional structures designed to link enforcers to the public they purport to represent, or to political representatives who are themselves connected to the public, also
can work to cement the connection between public enforcement and the public interest.
B. Enforcement and Independence
I have argued that accountability is critical—for reasons
both conceptual and consequential—if public enforcement is to
“represent” the public interest. But there is a potential problem. The goal of accountability is to make government responsive to the public. In the context of enforcement, however,
there is something unsettling about the notion that the government’s actions will channel the public will. Criminal-law scholars have noted this tension when writing about elected
prosecutors.126 What civil-law scholars have assumed is democratic, these scholars have seen as dangerous.
124
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“[A]
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .”); id. at r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s
behalf.”); see also supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (discussing the
client in public enforcement).
125
For commentary emphasizing the importance of internal mechanisms such
as “hierarchy controls, institutional norms, and professionalism” in shaping
agency behavior, see Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law Misunderstands
How Government Works: The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1
(2013); Shapiro & Wright, supra note 51, at 581.
126
See, e.g., Richman, supra note 20, at 957–58; see also Bruce A. Green &
Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 869 (2004)
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This subpart seeks to unpack the intuition behind the
unease. I suggest that worries about undue public influence
reflect two related sets of considerations. First, responsiveness
to public opinion threatens to undermine values associated
with the rule of law and related norms of neutrality. Second,
there may be good reasons to worry that public opinion about
enforcement will be ill-informed, or based on illegitimate considerations such as bias or animus toward particular groups or
individuals. These concerns are important, and they should
shape the way we organize and manage public enforcement.
But it is equally important to recognize that enforcement is not
sui generis in these respects. Instead, as the next section explains, the challenge described here is merely one manifestation of a broader puzzle in democratic theory about the
appropriate role of the political representative.
1. The Analogy to Adjudication
The discussion above likened enforcement to lawmaking.
Yet certain aspects of enforcement seem more akin to adjudication, triggering norms that may seem to be at odds with accountability—norms like impartiality and independence of
judgment.
The adjudicative aspects of enforcement are most evident
in the context of settlement. The overwhelming majority of enforcement actions are settled, typically with minimal (if any)
judicial oversight or involvement.127 As a practical matter,
then, enforcers often determine not only which actions to pursue but also how to resolve them. In such cases, enforcers are
not just advocates for one side; they have substantial responsibility for deciding what outcome is fair and just, all things
considered.128
(describing the view that “whatever else prosecutors do, they should act nonpolitically” and noting that “this view of neutrality appears to be inconsistent with the
separate notion that prosecutors should execute the public’s will, rather than
their own”).
127
See, e.g., Farber & O’Connell, supra note 52, at 1172 (“[A]pproximately
90% of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s and 80% of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)’s and Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)’s enforcement actions are settled.”); Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
1345, 1368–69 (2000) (“The huge majority of administrative enforcement proceedings settle; in these cases, there is no formal hearing and no possibility of judicial
review. . . .”).
128
Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) (“In the current era dominated by [criminal] pleas instead of trials, federal prosecutors are not
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Though it is difficult to overstate the significance of settlement, the analogy to adjudication holds even if we ignore the
reality of how cases are resolved and focus solely on the choice
of targets. Discrete decisions about which offenders to pursue
or which remedies to seek implicate the interests of identifiable
individuals or firms.129 The question is not what the law
should be going forward, but whether and how existing law
should be applied to a particular set of facts. Unlike judges,
enforcers may assess those questions from an advocate’s perspective, but their evaluation shares more in common with the
work of adjudicators than that of legislators crafting prospective, generally applicable law.
Consider, in this regard, the reasons the Court has offered
for permitting states with elected judiciaries to adopt more robust regulations for judicial elections than the First Amendment would permit for “political elections.”130 When dealing
with elections for “politicians,” the Court has brushed aside the
argument that Congress and the states ought to be able to
regulate campaign contributions and expenditures with a view
to minimizing, or equalizing, the influence of financial supporters. In the Court’s view,
[f]avoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics . . . . It is well understood that a substantial and
legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or
to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that
the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on
responsiveness.131

Not so for judges. The Court has acknowledged that states
have a compelling interest in guarding against “corruption” of
government.132 Because the nature of the judicial office differs
from that of a political office, so too do the considerations of
merely law enforcers. They are the final adjudicators in the vast majority of
cases.”).
129
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2363 (2001) (arguing that the different due process rules for lawmaking and
adjudication turn on “a distinction between relatively open-ended policymaking
. . . and relatively circumscribed resolution of discrete claims involving identifiable
firms or individuals”); see also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,
92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 (1978) (distinguishing, similarly, between
“polycentric” and “bipolar” disputes).
130
See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015).
131
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (quoting McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132
See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673.
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what will corrupt it. The Court has held that “ingratiation and
access . . . are not corruption” in the political context, but
instead “embody a central feature of democracy.”133 The judicial context is different, however: “In deciding cases,” the Court
has insisted, “a judge is not to follow the preferences of his
supporters, or provide any special consideration to his campaign donors.”134 Thus, “[j]udges, charged with exercising
strict neutrality and independence, cannot supplicate campaign donors without diminishing public confidence in judicial
integrity.”135
Much of what the Court has said about judges could also
be said about enforcers. For instance, in upholding state laws
prohibiting candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign contributions, the Court observed that “personal
solicitation by a judicial candidate ‘inevitably places the solicited individuals in a position to fear retaliation if they fail to
financially support that candidate.’”136 A similar risk arises in
the enforcement context. Consider a recent example. In early
2013, attorneys general from more than thirty states opened an
investigation into possible false advertising and deceptive marketing by the company that produces 5-Hour Energy, a caffeinated drink.137 According to the company, it then began to
receive requests for campaign contributions to the AGs involved in the investigation.138 Executives likened the solicitations to demands for “ransom.”139 To be sure, that account is
self-serving and ought to be taken with a healthy dose of salt.
But whether solicited or not, records show that 5-Hour Energy
contributed more than $280,000 to various AG’s political funds
in 2013 and 2014.140
Stories like this have special bite in the contexts of enforcement and adjudication, where government officials are called
upon to make decisions involving discrete and identifiable individuals and groups. Though the realities of privately funded
election campaigns might trigger concerns about favoritism or
vindictiveness in any circumstance, those concerns are more
133
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
134
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667.
135
Id. at 1666.
136
Id. at 1668 (quoting Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n,
247 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Ark. 2007)).
137
Lipton, supra note 85.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
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muted when government acts through generally applicable legislation or regulation. Even if campaign contributors have special access to and influence over law-makers, the fruits of their
labors will spill over to others: Any law will affect campaign
supporters and opponents alike. In the enforcement context,
by contrast—as with judging—it is possible to imagine the
worst sort of pay-to-play scenario, in which political supporters
are treated with favor and opponents are punished.141
The mere potential for such a scenario threatens to undermine the public’s confidence in the neutral administration of
justice.142 Although enforcers’ status as advocates means that
they are not held to the same “rigid” requirements of neutrality
as judges,143 they are obliged to be advocates for the public
interest, broadly—not for contributors or any other private interests. Indeed, courts long have held that government attorneys must be “impartial” in at least two respects: “they must
seek truth and not merely obtain convictions,” and their
“charging decisions should be based upon the evidence, without discrimination or bias for or against any groups or
individuals.”144
Perhaps not surprisingly, most discussions of this question focus on criminal prosecutions, where “liberty itself may
be at stake.”145 Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that
enforcement decisions in civil cases can “result in significant
burdens on a defendant or a statutory beneficiary, even if he is
ultimately vindicated.”146 It has therefore made clear that
141
This concern is not limited to states with elected AGs. At the federal level,
some studies indicate that campaign contributions to and lobbying of key members of Congress reduce the likelihood of SEC enforcement. See Urska Velikonja,
The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, 50 GA. L. REV. 17, 38–39 (2015).
142
Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (“[T]he public
may lack confidence in a judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or favor
if he comes to office by asking for favors.”).
143
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980).
144
State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 314 (Tenn. 2000); see People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 315–16 (Cal. 1996) (“[T]he district attorney is expected to
exercise his or her discretionary functions in the interest of the People at large,
and not under the influence or control of an interested individual.”); Wright v.
United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that a prosecutor
“is not disinterested if he has, or is under the influence of others who have, an axe
to grind against the defendant”); Commonwealth v. Tabor, 384 N.E.2d 190, 196
(Mass. 1978) (“In view of his great responsibilities, a district attorney may not
compromise his impartiality.”); see also Young v. U.S. ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987) (“[W]e must have assurance that those who would wield
[the prosecutorial] power will be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice.”).
145
Young, 481 U.S. at 810.
146
Marshall, 446 U.S. at 249.
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there are limits on the permissible “partisanship” of government attorneys in civil and criminal cases alike.147 It follows—
to paraphrase what the Court has said of judges—that a government attorney “is not to follow the preferences of his supporters, or provide any special consideration to his campaign
donors” in selecting cases for enforcement.148
2. The Uneasy Role for Public Opinion
The 5-Hour Energy story might be understood as capture
redux—an example of private influence (or enforcer self-interest) threatening to trump the public interest. I want to suggest,
however, that the lesson goes deeper than that. That is, the
analogy to judging ought to give us pause about public influence, too.
Imagine that government officials have access to a publicopinion poll on some question. What role—if any—should the
results of the poll play in the officials’ decision-making process? Most commentators would agree that an opinion poll
could be a legitimate input for a legislative decision, though
they might disagree over whether legislative representatives
could justify their decisions solely by reference to public opinion.149 If the officials in question were judges, the consensus
would likely shift from approval to disapproval.150 What about
enforcement? Could a government enforcer properly base the
decision to pursue a particular target, or seek a particular
sanction, on the results of a public opinion poll? The answer to
this question seems to fall somewhere between the answer for
legislators and for judges, and—revealingly—the reasons for
hesitation are similar to the reasons we might give in the judicial context.
First, many laws are designed to protect individuals from
majority will. Anti-discrimination laws are the clearest, but
hardly the only, examples. To allow enforcement of those laws
147

Id. at 247–49.
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015).
149
This disagreement proves to be important for enforcement; we will return
to it below. See infra subpart II.C.
150
See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson Before the American Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence, Washington, D.C., December 13, 1996, 12 St. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 69, 70 (1996) (“Individual judicial independence . . . embodies the concept
that individual judges decide cases fairly, impartially and according to the facts
and the law, not according to . . . the latest [public] opinion poll.”); Vicki C.
Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III
Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 969 (2007) (arguing that judges must be independent of
“popular passions”).
148
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to turn on majority preferences would pervert their purpose
and undermine their efficacy. As the Supreme Court once put
it, one’s “rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections.”151 The Court was talking about
the judging, of course. But cases do not simply materialize on
courts’ dockets; they come to judges because a plaintiff (public
or private) chooses to assert the right in question. If enforcement decisions were controlled by popular demand, our law
would suffer just as surely as if judicial decisions were generated by a vote of the people.
Second, enforcement decisions may be highly discretionary, but they need not be standardless.152 One of the conventional markers of a judicial abuse of discretion is the failure to
consider relevant considerations, or the reliance on irrelevant
considerations.153 Similar notions can inform enforcement.
Analysis of the law being enforced, and the purposes that animate it, will often generate a range of factors to guide the exercise of discretion. And the goal of deterrence itself supplies a
framework for decision. The easiest case for our hypothetical
public-opinion poll is one in which the poll sheds light on the
deterrence calculus, or informs a consideration that positive
law deems relevant—for example, by conveying information
about the harm caused by certain conduct. Even in that case,
though, public opinion is one factor in the enforcement
calculus, and it might be outweighed by competing considerations. To treat public opinion as an independently sufficient
basis for decision, without carefully weighing the purposes of
the relevant law or how best to promote deterrence, would undermine the core function of public enforcement: to serve the
public interest.
Third and closely related, enforcement decisions are also
legal decisions.154 That’s most obvious when enforcement initiatives depend on particular interpretations of the statutes in
question. Yet even when enforcers are working within the
metes and bounds of a concededly permissible interpretation,
their choices about which offenders to pursue or which sanctions to seek can have profound consequences for what the law
means in practice. Those choices should rest on principle, not
151

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
Green & Zacharias, supra note 126, at 842.
153
See generally Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of
Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 47, 47–51 (2000).
154
See Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript
at 40) (on file with author) (arguing that “programmatic enforcement decision(s)”
are “fundamentally . . . act(s) of interpretation”).
152
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will; they should not be arbitrary.155 Our commitment to the
rule of law entails a commitment to treating like cases alike.
Where that is impossible (perhaps because resource constraints or concerns about over-enforcement prevent enforcers
from pursuing all offenses of a certain type) the reasons for
selecting one case rather than another should be—at the very
least—capable of generalization.156 Again, public opinion may
sometimes reflect such reasons. But a theory of enforcement
that works for one case only cannot be squared with the values
of consistency, predictability, and fair notice that underlie the
rule of law.
Finally, public opinion will often be misinformed or uninformed. It may rest on false premises about the law or the
conduct in question, or on considerations that the law deems
irrelevant. The public may lack the information, and the experience, that enforcers can access. Worse, public opinion may
be based on considerations that the law places off-limits: racial
bias, for example, or personal animus. These concerns are
heightened in case-specific decisions with identifiable targets.
The general public will rarely have the information and expertise necessary to gauge whether law-enforcement goals would
be better served by pursuing one case rather than another.
Meanwhile, the more targeted the decision, the greater the risk
of bias and other improper motivations. As then-Professor
Elena Kagan once wrote, “it is in this area, because so focused
on particular individuals and firms, that the crassest forms of
politics (involving, at the extreme, personal favors and vendettas) pose the greatest danger of displacing professionalism and
thereby undermining confidence in legal decisionmaking.”157
Kagan was arguing against presidential control of discrete enforcement decisions—an exception to her general endorsement
of “presidential administration.”158 But the concern extends
155
Cf. Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction:
Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95
CAL. L. REV. 1473 (2007).
156
Cf. Sohoni, supra note 154, at 41–42 (using rule-of-law values to support a
vision of “faithful” enforcement that “reflect[s] the enforcer’s honest and disinterested belief that enforcement at that level is the best way to enforce the law—
where ‘best’ is measured not only by the literal text of the statute, but also by the
law’s purpose and context, by the public interest, and by constitutional values”).
157
Kagan, supra note 129, at 2357–58; accord Andrias, supra note 12, at
1071–72 (raising similar concerns about presidential control of discrete enforcement decisions).
158
Kagan, supra note 129, at 2357 (acknowledging that the limitation is “untraditional” since “[r]esolution of prosecutorial questions usually is conceived as
lying at the heart of the executive power vested in the President”).
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beyond presidential meddling, and is not limited to “personal
favors and vendettas.”159 Depending on its basis, broad-based
public sentiment can also be an illegitimate justification for
enforcement. Much as we would decry a judicial decision
based on the public’s desire to punish a particular defendant,
we should disapprove of enforcement decisions that echo the
angry mob.
C. Enforcement as Political Representation
All of this helps explain why it is rarely a compliment to
describe enforcement as “political.”160 But here we find ourselves at a seeming impasse, for enforcement is political—undeniably, unavoidably so. Ours is not the German system of
mandatory prosecution, under which enforcers are expected to
pursue every violation.161 And that is not an oversight, or an
evil made necessary by limited resources. We depend on public
enforcers to exercise discretion, to translate what are often
overbroad or rigid statutes and regulations into workable rules
for real life.
One possible response to this conundrum is to emphasize
the distinction between broad policy and case-specific decision
making that Kagan and others have drawn in the context of
presidential control of enforcement. Perhaps policy decisions
should be responsive to public pressures, but case-specific decisions insulated from them. The difficulty is that the line between policy-formation and -application is fuzzy at best. Policy
decisions are—in a sense—simply the aggregation of individual
enforcement decisions. Some policy questions may not even
occur to enforcers unless and until they are confronted with

159

Id. at 2358.
See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Hyper Hacks: What’s Really Wrong With the Bush
Justice Department, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/03/hyper_hacks.html [https://
perma.cc/LU37-XTS5] (criticizing the second Bush Administration for its “disdain
for the nonpolitical tradition of federal law enforcement”); Michael W. Dolan,
Political Influence on the Department of Justice: Are the Pressures Only External?, 9
J.L. & POL. 309, 312 (1993) (“Rare is the federal prosecutor who has not been
described by his or her enemies as politically ambitious . . . .”); William Safire,
Guarding the Guardians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1986, at A15 (criticizing “political
prosecutors who will do anything for publicity”).
161
See Sara Sun Beale, Prosecutorial Discretion in Three Systems: Balancing
Conflicting Goals and Providing Mechanisms for Control, in DISCRETIONARY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 27, 44–45 (Michele Caianiello & Jacqueline S.
Hodgson eds., 2015) (describing the German system of prosecution).
160
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cases that pose the questions. Individualized enforcement decisions may be decisions about policy, and vice versa.162
I want to offer a different way forward. If we think about
enforcement as part of a larger system of governance, we can
recognize the tension sketched in this Part as a familiar one. A
similar ambivalence about the relationship between government action and the public will is reflected in age-old debates
about the nature of political representation. As noted, elections are critical to most theories of political representation:
elections promote accountability, which in turn encourages
government officials to promote the interests of the people they
ostensibly represent. But suppose we are some years out from
an election—say, three years into a six-year term. What does it
mean to say that a community is being represented well or
poorly? Should representatives follow the wishes of their constituents, or should they exercise autonomous judgment in
service of their constituents’ welfare?163
The challenge identified in this Part seems incurable only if
one insists that representation—and accountability, which
promotes meaningful representation—obligates officials to follow their constituents’ wishes, full stop. But few theorists take
that position. Some argue, as a conceptual matter, that the
duty of the representative is to pursue her constituents’ objective interests, regardless of what the constituents say they
want at any given moment.164 Others argue that the empirical
reality is that constituents are rationally uninformed about
most issues that government must confront, and in such circumstances the representative has little choice but to exercise
autonomous judgment. Still others take a more nuanced view,
acknowledging that representation has gone astray if it departs
162
Cf. Andrias, supra note 12, at 1101–02 (acknowledging that “presidential
involvement should not be verboten” when “policy is made through individual
enforcement actions or when an individual enforcement action has broad-reaching and likely recurring policy consequences”).
163
See PITKIN, supra note 22, at 145 (describing this as “the central classic
controversy in the literature of political representation”).
164
This approach, often associated with Edmund Burke, is sometimes called
the “independence” or “trusteeship” model of representation. See Andrew
Rehfield, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in
the Study of Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214,
214–15 (2009). See also Jane Mansbridge, Clarifying the Concept of Representation, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 621, 621 (2011) (defending a theory of “gyroscopic”
representation in which representatives exercise self-reliant judgment and are
relatively unresponsive to ex post sanctions). Mansbridge distinguishes her theory from Burke’s more elitist version on the ground that, unlike Burke, she does
not suggest that “the representative has more wisdom, intelligence, or prudence
than the voter.” Id. at 623.
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repeatedly from the wishes of the represented, but insisting
nevertheless that a representative need not—and should not—
slavishly follow her constituents’ preferences in every instance.
This approach is exemplified in Hanna Pitkin’s famous work on
the concept of representation. Pitkin argues that political representation “means acting in the interest of the represented, in
a manner responsive to them.”165 Normally, that will mean
that representatives must act in accordance with the preferences of their constituents—when constituents have preferences, that is. But not always. “[L]eadership, emergency
action, action on issues of which the people know nothing are
among the important realities of representative government.
They are not deviations from true representation, but its very
essence.”166 Thus, for Pitkin, the representative’s ultimate obligation is to do what is good for her constituents, not to follow
their every wish.167 To be sure, constituents’ wishes are relevant to their interests, and in most cases the two will be aligned.168 “Consequently,” Pitkin explains, “the representative
also has an obligation to be responsive to those wishes. He
need not always obey them, but he must consider
them . . . .”169 And, importantly,
when a representative finds himself in conflict with his constituents’ wishes, this fact must give him pause. It calls for a
consideration of the reasons for the discrepancy; it may call
for a reconsideration of his own views. It is not sufficient for
him to choose; it is necessary that the choice be
justifiable.170

Contemporary theorists continue to debate the meaning of
representation, but most join Pitkin in rejecting the most extreme “mandate” or “delegate” view, under which the representative is duty-bound to follow—and, where necessary, to
solicit—constituents’ views.171 Like Pitkin, they recognize that
165

PITKIN, supra note 22, at 209–10.
Id. at 163.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 162.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 163–64.
171
See, e.g., Manin, supra note 24, at 163 (emphasizing that “[r]epresentative
systems do not authorize (indeed explicitly prohibit) two practices that would
deprive representatives of any kind of independence: imperative mandates and
discretionary revocability of representatives (recall)”); Rehfield, supra note 164, at
214 (“No one expects there to be an exact correspondence between [the laws of a
nation and the preferences of the citizens governed by them]. . . . As long as . . .
deviations do not become the norm (in which the law routinely fails to correspond
to citizen preferences), they fit well within broad conceptions of democracy.”);
Urbinati & Warren, supra note 26, at 398 (“Elections establish the
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constituent preferences are an important policy input. Genuine representation means that representatives will not lightly
depart from their constituents’ wishes.172 Decisions that deviate from public preferences are permissible, but they must be
capable of justification in terms of the public interest.173
Though couched in terms of representation, this approach
extends to questions of accountability. Accountability, after
all, is a means of securing effective representation. Depending
on how one conceives of representation, accountability need
not be equated with mindless obedience to the public will. As
Jeremy Waldron puts it, “[i]nstruction is one thing; accountability is another.”174
As applied to enforcement, the advantage of this approach
is that it allows us to incorporate the concerns identified in the
previous section—the risk of favoritism for certain parties or
animus toward others; the likelihood that public opinion on
enforcement will be uninformed or misinformed; the possible
tension between majority preferences and the purposes of the
law being enforced; and so on—into, rather than in opposition
to, a theory of representation and accountability. The considerations that make fealty to public preferences worrisome in
some instances are also precisely the types of considerations
that could justify a deviation from the public’s wishes.175 It
does not follow, however, that the public’s wishes are, or
should be, irrelevant. We can say, coherently, that public enforcement must be accountable, that it must take account of
public preferences and respond to those preferences, without
endorsing the notion that enforcement decisions should be
governed by public opinion polls. Enforcement decisions
nonindependence of the representative from the represented in principle, although in practice, representative institutions require enough autonomy to carry
out their political functions, which will require bodies that can engage in deliberative political judgments.”); cf. Brown, supra note 28, at 555 (“One hardly incites
controversy today to say that the [U.S.] Constitution does not envision a pure
democracy in which elections serve only to translate popular will into law.”).
172
See MANIN, supra note 24, at 170 (“Representatives are not required to act
on the wishes of the people, but neither can they ignore them . . . . It is the
representatives who make the final decisions, but a framework is created in which
the will of the people is one of the considerations in their decision process.”).
173
Rehfield, supra note 164, at 214 (“[W]e must always justify and explain
cases in which law deviates from citizen preferences . . . .”).
174
Waldron, supra note 27, at 22.
175
See PITKIN, supra note 22, at 210–12; Rehfield, supra note 164, at 214
(“[D]eviations [from public preferences] may be justified for familiar reasons: citizens often have no formed views on what the law should be; . . . their preferences
may not conform to their true interests and will change over time, or their preferences may be trumped by more important principles of justice (including, but not
limited to, the protection of minority rights.”).
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should not be blind to public opinion in the way we might
imagine for judicial decisions. Yet, at the same time, the
targeted and retroactive nature of enforcement—the features
that prompt calls for “neutrality”—may provide stronger justification for departures from public preferences than would be
appropriate in the legislative context.
To be sure, it will not always be easy to identify the proper
balance between responsiveness and autonomy in practice.
For example, reasonable minds may disagree over whether
public opinion on a given issue is misinformed, or simply reflects an alternate vision of the public good that enforcers
should take seriously. The virtue of this conception of enforcement is not that it will resolve all disagreements over the legitimacy of particular enforcement efforts, but that it helps us
identify what we should be arguing about.
III
ENFORCEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE
Understanding public enforcement as political representation helps resolve the theoretical tension described in the previous Part. But it also highlights the enormous practical
challenge of designing effective accountability mechanisms for
enforcement. This Part begins that work, examining our existing laws and institutional structures to assess whether, and
to what extent, public enforcement is accountable in fact.
Though I offer several suggestions for reform, the primary goal
of this and the following Part is to expose the inadequacies in
our current treatment of enforcement. As things stand, there is
little cause to believe that public enforcement will be responsive to the public it ostensibly represents. Making matters
worse, there is good reason to fear that public enforcement will
be influenced by narrow private interests. Returning to the
risk of capture described above, Part IV shows that our existing
system is doubly flawed: while enforcement is largely inaccessible to the public, it is vulnerable to private pressures.
A. Federal Enforcement: Political Controls
No federal enforcers are elected. In the absence of elections, U.S. law and policy tend to fall back on more indirect
means of promoting political accountability. That strategy is
on full display in federal administrative law and scholarship,
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where accountability has been a central preoccupation.176 In
the regulatory context, the dominant response to the “serious
legitimacy problem” posed by lawmaking by unelected bureaucrats has been to emphasize the connection between agency
personnel and elected officials—the President and members of
Congress—who are in a position to influence or control agencies’ work.177 This section considers analogous mechanisms in
the context of enforcement. It shows that the political controls
that we rely on to legitimize administrative regulation are significantly weaker for enforcement.
1. The President
The unitary structure of the federal executive means that
enforcement authority rests with the President and his or her
subordinates. The actual work of enforcement is handled by
specialized agencies or the generalist Department of Justice
(DOJ). And, as is true in the context of regulation, the connection to the President varies in strength depending on whether
the agency in question is categorized as “independent” or
“executive.”178
Most high-ranking federal enforcers are political appointees. The President appoints agency heads with the advice and
consent of the Senate.179 In the case of independent agencies,
presidential appointments are constrained by bipartisanship
requirements and staggered terms for commissioners.180 The
President also appoints key personnel at DOJ, including the
Attorney General, the Deputy and Assistant Attorneys General,
and the ninety-three U.S. Attorneys.181 Most of the legal work
176
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657, 1659 (2004) (describing the “‘accountability theory’ of administrative law, which seeks to subject agency decisionmaking to the control of politically accountable officials” and has been used since
the 1970s “to conform agency decisionmaking with the notion, widespread in
broader constitutional theory, that popular rule is the cornerstone of democratic
legitimacy”).
177
Shapiro & Wright, supra note 51, at 580.
178
See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013) (discussing the
distinction between executive and independent agencies).
179
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Farber & O’Connell, supra note 52, at 1152
(“[A]gency heads contribute to the political accountability rationale for agency
deference through their assumed connection to the President and
Congress . . . .”).
180
See Datla & Revesz, supra note 178, at 792–99 (citing multi-member structure and partisan balance requirements as two indicia of independence).
181
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & JERRY W. MANSFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30959, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND
COMMITTEES HANDLING NOMINATIONS 42–43 (2016).

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN402.txt

970

unknown

Seq: 42

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

11-MAY-17

14:09

[Vol. 102:929

at specialized agencies is handled by the agency’s general
counsel and staff, though some agencies have special divisions
devoted to enforcement.182 The general counsel is a presidential appointee in all executive agencies; in the independent
agencies, some general counsels are picked by the agency’s
leadership and some are appointed by the President.183 Even
where agency general counsel is formally nominated by the
President, however, “[m]ore often than not . . . the general
counsel is effectively selected by the head of the agency, to
whose judgment the president defers. Thus, the counsel’s loyalties may run primarily to the agency head and secondarily to
the president.”184
High-ranking enforcement officials also differ in terms of
their protection from removal: some may be removed by the
President at will, others only for cause.185 Here, too, the distinction typically follows the line between executive agencies
and independent agencies. U.S. Attorneys, for example, “serve
at the discretion of[ ] the President”186 and may be removed at
will.187 President George W. Bush made use of that power in
2006, when he fired seven U.S. Attorneys for reasons that
seemed to have little to do with performance and everything to
do with partisan politics.188 The firings provoked a heated controversy and ultimately congressional hearings and an investigation by the DOJ’s Inspector General.189 Critics argued that
the President had violated longstanding norms against
politicizing the DOJ, which permitted “en masse replacement of
U.S. Attorneys at the time of a partisan change of administration, but barred targeted removal midstream.”190 But the law
remains unchanged: U.S. Attorneys may be removed from of182
See generally Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular: Governmental Role of
the Agency General Counsel, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 143, 143 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995) (exploring
the role of the agency general counsel).
183
See id. at 147.
184
Id.
185
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 483 (2010) (describing the constitutional framework for the President’s removal authority).
186
Mission, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS http://www.justice.gov/
usao/mission [https://perma.cc/9NBU-8Z92] (last updated Sept. 22, 2016).
187
See, e.g., Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 343 (1897) (holding that
U.S. Attorneys have no tenure protection).
188
For a detailed analysis of the U.S. Attorney firings, see generally U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF
NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008) [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
189
See id. at 1–5.
190
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1163, 1202 (2013).
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fice for virtually any reason, including their decisions in individual cases.191
Below the very top level of enforcement officials, elections
and political appointments fade away. Most of the day-to-day
work is done by civil servants, often careerists who stay in their
jobs through changing presidential administrations.192 Depending on the agency (and sometimes the issue), career attorneys may have substantial autonomy over enforcement
choices, or may have to run proposed actions up the flagpole to
agency brass before moving forward.
The bureaucratic structure sketched here—political appointees at the top of the hierarchy, with civil servants performing much of the critical work—is precisely what prompts
concerns about democratic legitimacy in the regulatory context.193 As Part I suggests, scholars have produced a veritable
mountain of commentary grappling with the challenges of accountability in the modern administrative state. One response
has been to strengthen the connection between regulatory policy and the President, primarily by formalizing centralized executive review of agency regulations via the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).194 Such review is
considered a key source of political accountability for federal
agencies.195
The existing tools of regulatory review apply only to regulation, however. Enforcement looks downright anarchic by comparison. That claim may seem odd, as centralization is
typically listed (along with accountability) as one of the characteristics that distinguish public enforcement from the private
191
See OIG REPORT, supra note 188, at 202–03, 205–09 (discussing evidence
that U.S. Attorney Daniel Bogden was removed because (among other reasons)
“[d]espite the national focus the Attorney General requested for offices to place on
the federal crime of obscenity, which coarsens society, the USA failed to support
the Department’s prosecution of a case that was developed within his district”).
192
See Herz, supra note 182, at 148 (discussing the role of career attorneys in
agency general counsel offices).
193
See, e.g., de Figueiredo & Stiglitz, supra note 35, at 2 (noting “a fundamental normative question that has occupied scholars since the inception of the
administrative state: in what sense can administrative rulemaking be ‘democratic’
if we do not elect the individuals writing the rules?”).
194
See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 52, at 1162–69 (describing the scope
and details of OIRA review).
195
Proponents argue that OIRA review “promotes responsiveness to the policy
preferences of the general public.” Kagan, supra note 129, at 2333. Agency
employees likewise report that the President plays a “democratizing role” in
agency regulation. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105
MICH. L. REV. 47, 89–90 (2006).
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alternative.196 And at first blush, public enforcement within
the federal system does appear to be centralized, because most
litigation authority is vested in one institution: the DOJ. Unless they have explicit statutory authority to do so, agencies
may not litigate cases themselves or hire outside (non-DOJ)
lawyers to do the work.197 Like centralized regulatory review,
DOJ’s control of federal litigation can be understood in terms of
accountability. Centralization channels litigation decisions
through Main Justice—an institution close to the President
both physically and philosophically. Because the Attorney
General “sees the big picture—and sees it with the same eyes
as the President—centralization ensures that the lawyering is
consistent with the broader policy concerns of the
Administration.”198
Yet closer inspection reveals significant limitations in DOJ
control as a means of securing political accountability for public enforcement. To begin with, DOJ’s influence only works in
one direction—to dampen enforcement. DOJ can refuse to
pursue an enforcement action the relevant agency has proposed, but there is little DOJ can do if the agency itself has
opted not to take action.199 The rule of DOJ control is also
riddled with exceptions. As Neal Devins and Michael Herz have
shown, “Congress has significantly eroded the Attorney General’s role as chief litigator for the United States, vesting at
least some independent litigating authority in approximately
three-dozen governmental entities.”200 To name just a few examples, the Department of Labor, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission all have authority to litigate civil enforcement actions themselves.201 Although independent litigating authority is more common for

196
See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 73, at 39 (discussing the implications of “the existence of a public monopoly of enforcement”).
197
Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice
Control of Federal Litigation, 5 J. CONST. L. 558, 560–61 (2003); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 516 (2012) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in
which the United States, an agency, or an officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of
Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”).
198
Herz & Devins, supra note 127, at 1346.
199
See Devins & Herz, supra note 197, at 562–63.
200
Id. at 561.
201
See Marshall J. Berger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory
and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1236–94
(2000) (cataloguing litigation authority among independent agencies, boards, and
commissions).
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independent agencies than executive agencies,202 there is little
rhyme or reason to the existing patterns. Instead, “the scope
(and indeed, the very existence) of independent litigation authority seems more haphazard than purposeful.”203
Complicating matters further, it is essential to distinguish
between litigation authority and enforcement authority. The
latter includes the authority to undertake enforcement actions
that do not end up in court—including administrative proceedings. Administrative proceedings are, by a long stretch, the
dominant form of enforcement by federal agencies.204 DOJ
plays no role in administrative enforcement; decision-making
authority lies in the hands of each agency.205
Equally important, there is no established process of centralized executive-branch review of more generalized decisions
about enforcement policy—that is, broader determinations
about what types of offenses to prioritize or deemphasize, as
opposed to decisions to litigate or appeal a particular case. As
Kate Andrias has detailed, there are no systems in place that
resemble (even roughly) the formal system of centralized regulatory review.206 The consequence is that the President’s role
in enforcement policy is largely ad hoc and invisible.
Of course, ad hoc influence is still influence, and presidents can and do shape enforcement policy through more informal means. But top-down oversight works as a tool of
accountability only if the lines of influence, and their consequences, are visible to the public. In the enforcement context,
however, transparency is the exception rather than the rule.
Study after study shows that enforcement changes as presidential administrations change.207 Antitrust scholars often
refer to enforcement as a “pendulum” that swings back and
202
Devins & Herz, supra note 197, at 564. By contrast, control of criminal
prosecutions is much more tightly centralized than is control of civil enforcement.
See id. at 561 (“DOJ is particularly dominant in criminal prosecutions.”).
203
Neal Devins, Toward an Understanding of Legal Policy-Making in Independent Agencies, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, supra note 182, at 143, 181–82.
204
Devins & Herz, supra note 197, at 566.
205
Id. (“With the rarest of exceptions, administrative enforcement proceedings
are handled by agency attorneys. DOJ is simply not involved . . . .”).
206
Andrias, supra note 12, at 1057–69.
207
See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 197–98 (1982) (finding variation in enforcement
efforts of National Labor Relations Board, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission based on presidential administration in office); B.
Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 821–23 (1991) (finding significant effects
on the behavior of seven agencies).
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forth, particularly on the appropriateness of using antitrust
law to police the behavior of dominant firms with outsize market power.208 Civil rights enforcement reflects a similar pattern,209 with studies documenting (among other things)
changes in enforcers’ relative emphasis on different types of
discrimination—for example, racial or religious.210
Other studies reveal changes in enforcement intensity. For
example, a recent report showed that inspections by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had remained relatively stable from the Bush to Obama
administrations, but the number of citations issued for violations skyrocketed under Obama’s leadership, increasing 167%
during his first full year in office.211 The same report showed
that the Obama EPA was pursuing more administrative enforcement actions under the Clean Air Act than the Bush
EPA.212 However, while the EPA appeared to be assessing penalties more frequently under the Obama administration, the
average penalty amount had decreased significantly since the
Bush years.213
The list could go on, but the point should be clear: Enforcement policies are anything but static, and the identity of the
President matters a great deal. But the process by which the
relevant information comes to light runs precisely backwards.
As Part I explained, a core component of accountability is the
ability of the public to “call [their representatives] to account,”
to obtain an explanation of public policies. We the People
should not have to rely on scholarly empirical studies to learn
of tectonic shifts in enforcement strategy, or to draw out rationalizations from the officials responsible.214 At the very least,
208
See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition
Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 378 (2003) (“One common narrative of U.S. antitrust history depicts federal enforcement policy since 1960 as a
swinging pendulum.”).
209
See Selmi, supra note 103, at 1440–41 (“Since the passage of the Civil
Rights Acts in the 1960s, each shift in political party has brought significant
change in civil rights enforcement.”).
210
See Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons
Learned, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 80–81 (2009) (describing a decrease
in cases involving racial discrimination, and an increased focus on combatting
religious discrimination, under the George W. Bush Administration); see also
Kim, supra note 12, at 23–21 (detailing similar shifts in focus in the Department
of Education’s Office of Civil Rights).
211
OMB WATCH, THE OBAMA APPROACH TO PUBLIC PROTECTION: ENFORCEMENT 8
(2010).
212
Id. at 28.
213
Id. at 28–29.
214
See Waldron, supra note 27, at 7 (“What the agent owes his principal(s) in
the first instance is an account of what he has been doing. Confronted with the
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it is difficult to argue that federal enforcement is rendered accountable by virtue of the connection to the President when the
President’s influence is uncertain and unpublicized.
2. Congressional Oversight
Agency action also is subject to oversight and control by
elected representatives in the legislature. Legislative oversight
is important for several reasons. Most obviously, it offers an
additional source of indirect accountability, a means for the
people to influence enforcement via their legislative representatives.215 But legislatures are also “the main public repositories
of government information, through their statutory rights to
receive reports from public bodies and their powers of independent interrogation and investigation. They . . . lay the foundation for much public debate, thus contributing to the broader
public accountability of government.”216
Here too, however, the lines of influence begin to fray as we
move from regulation to enforcement.217 Congressional attention to enforcement vacillates between spotty and non-existent.
In some respects, the patterns are similar to what we see in the
regulatory context. For example, legislative oversight is more
robust during periods of divided government than when the
same party controls both the legislative and executive
branches.218 Similarly, legislators are likely to attend more
frequently to issues of high public salience. Thus, some agencies are recurring targets of legislative oversight, for both enforcement and regulation.219 Others fly largely under the
radar—that is, until outside events (such as a well-publicized
scandal or disaster) bring them into the public eye.220
demand for such an account, the agent may not say: ‘Well, it is up to you to find
out what I have been doing, and then you see if you can understand it and if you
are in a position to assess it.’”).
215
See MULGAN, supra note 24, at 40 (“Between elections, much accountability
activity is focused on the legislature which has the constitutional power to scrutini[z]e the actions of the executive through various channels.”).
216
Id. at 46.
217
Though the discussion here focuses on the relationship between federal
agencies and Congress, much of it applies with equal force at the state level.
218
See, e.g., Liu, supra note 210, at 87–88 (noting that Congress held no
oversight hearings on civil rights enforcement during the four-year period of unified government under George W. Bush; “[a]fter control of Congress changed
hands in 2006, legislative oversight became more vigorous”).
219
See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 141, at 23–28 (discussing increased congressional attention to the SEC in recent decades and arguing that the SEC is now
“vulnerable to the political whims of congressmen”).
220
See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 108, at 879–83 (discussing variations in
congressional scrutiny of different agencies).
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Critically, though, while legislators have various means of
influencing agency regulations before they become final, control over enforcement is almost entirely ex post, and less effective as a result. In the regulatory context, notice-and-comment
procedures force agencies to reveal proposed rules before they
are set in stone, giving interest groups and sympathetic legislators an opportunity to intervene.221 Rules that delay the effective date of regulations for a specified period likewise “slow the
regulatory process so that advocates of congressional viewpoints will have time to mobilize and influence policy outcomes.”222 Enforcement decisions, by contrast, tend to be
presented to the legislature as faits accomplis. Legislators may
harangue the relevant agency officials after the fact, but there
is little they can do to influence discrete enforcement decisions
before they are implemented.
To be sure, the threat of future legislative reprisals may
influence enforcers’ behavior in the present. This is, after all,
how elections are thought to work. As described in Part I, “[t]he
influence of elections spreads far beyond the election process
through the indirect power of anticipated reactions.”223 So too,
perhaps, with ex post legislative control of enforcement.
The difficulty is that the existing system of legislative control is neither designed nor used to promote meaningful accountability for public enforcement. Congress can, of course,
change enforcement by changing the statutes that are being
enforced. If agencies are pursuing violations that legislators do
not deem blameworthy, the legislature can tighten up the relevant substantive provisions to remove those violations from the
statute’s scope going forward. And if legislators are concerned
about enforcement of marginal cases, they can craft statutes
narrowly and carefully in the first instance. Though one
should not be too sanguine about these possibilities—the literature on delegations to agencies highlights multiple reasons
why legislation tends to be written in broad and ambiguous
221
See generally Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
243, 256–59 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 442 (1989).
222
de Figueiredo & Stiglitz, supra note 35, at 22; see also Congressional
Review Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–121, §§ 251–53, 110 Stat. 868, 868–74
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 801–08 (2012) (enacting procedures for fasttracked congressional review of agency rules before they take effect).
223
MULGAN, supra note 24, at 43; see supra notes 32–34 and accompanying
text.
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terms224—it is worth noting that the prospect of narrowlydrawn legislation is greater in the civil context than in the
realm of criminal law. Criminal-law scholars despair of constraining prosecutorial discretion through legislation, for the
simple reason that the politics of crime control are so onesided.225 While various influential constituencies (including
but not limited to prosecutors themselves) benefit from broad
criminal law, there is rarely anyone to make the counter-argument.226 Convicted or would-be criminals have no lobby. On
the civil side, by contrast, regulated entities do have lobbies—
powerful ones. It is at least possible, then, to imagine Congress
constraining enforcement by limiting the range of offenses that
can trigger an enforcement action. But those limits would apply with equal force to both public and private enforcement;
they do nothing to support the argument that public enforcement is uniquely accountable, or responsive to the public, by
virtue of the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches.
A more promising source of accountability can be found in
the congressional power of the purse.227 Unlike their private
counterparts, public enforcers operate within budgets that are
controlled by legislative appropriations. The budgeting process
is an opportunity for both “calling to account”—extracting information about enforcement—and “holding to account”—
sanctioning enforcement that is ineffective or misguided, or
rewarding enforcement that effectively promotes the public interest. Theoretically, at least, Congress could use the budgeting process to push enforcement in desired directions, devoting
funds to certain enforcement initiatives while withholding
funds from others.228 In reality, this happens rarely: the norm
224
E.g., David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 135–36 (2000) (“There are two obvious reasons [why
Congress does not currently enact highly specific legislation], one involving transaction costs and the other involving political expediency.”).
225
See Bibas, supra note 20, at 964 (critiquing proposals for “legislation to
rein in prosecutors” on the ground that “[l]egislators collude to maximize
prosecutorial bargaining freedom and are not about to rein it in”).
226
See Stuntz, supra note 99, at 529–46.
227
See Barkow, supra note 104, at 43 (“[T]he power of the purse is one of the
key ways in which democratic accountability is served.”).
228
See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34354, CONGRESSIONAL
INFLUENCE ON RULEMAKING AND REGULATION THROUGH APPROPRIATION RESTRICTIONS
12–13 (2008) (noting two examples in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2008 that prohibited the use of appropriated funds for the enforcement of particular regulations); Andrias, supra note 12, at 1044–45 & n.43 (discussing limitations riders and noting that the Fiscal Year 2012 budget “included a rider
preventing the government from enforcing new light bulb efficiency standards”).
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is a lump-sum appropriation that covers enforcement of diverse provisions.229 Thus, while legislators can use the budget
process to signal their approval or disapproval for particular
enforcement agencies—and to facilitate more or less enforcement—the tool is a relatively blunt one.
When legislators do use budgeting to control enforcement,
moreover, their directives are often obscured from public view
and from the usual processes of legislative and public debate.
“Limitations riders”—provisions forbidding the use of appropriated funds for particular uses—are, at best, buried in lengthy
appropriations bills.230 More commonly, directives about how
the funds are to be spent appear in appropriations committee
reports, not in the actual text of the bill.231
Budget controls are made weaker still by the trend toward
self-funded enforcement—a phenomenon that exists at both
levels of government, though it is more prevalent in the
states.232 Enforcement agencies often are permitted to retain a
portion of the proceeds of enforcement to fund future enforcement efforts.233 Such arrangements do not allow agencies to
avoid the appropriations process entirely, but they provide a
significant buffer between agencies’ enforcement policies and
year-to-year fluctuations in legislative favor.234
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, to the extent that
budgeting concerns shape agency behavior, the effects may be
largely perverse. Federal agencies must submit annual budget
requests to Congress, and most agencies use the occasion as
an opportunity to trumpet their enforcement efforts.235 Like
anyone facing an assessment, agencies have strong incentives
229
See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs, Private
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1290–91 (1982) (“Occasionally . . . the legislature
acts decisively to control enforcement politics. But such control is infrequent and
episodic.”).
230
Jason A. MacDonald, Limitations Riders and Congressional Influence over
Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 766, 766 (2010) (“Limitation
riders are provisions in appropriations bills that forbid agencies from spending
money for specific purposes during the next fiscal year.”).
231
ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 102, 271 (3d
ed. 2007).
232
Cf. Barkow, supra note 104, at 44 (discussing self-funding (through fee
collection and the like) as weakening legislative control over agencies’ regulatory
functions).
233
Lemos & Minzner, supra note 108, at 864–75.
234
See id. at 873–75 (discussing the relationship to annual appropriations).
235
See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 912–19 (2016) (discussing why and
how agencies report).
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to emphasize easily measurable indicia of effectiveness.236
Congress has reinforced those incentives by requiring agencies
to submit annual performance plans expressing “goals in an
objective, quantifiable, and measurable form.”237
The consequences of this system are both predictable and
pernicious. The information in agencies’ annual reports is
overwhelmingly quantitative—the number of investigations
opened, cases closed, dollars recovered.238 Recent scholarship
has shown that the numbers themselves are often misleading
or unreliable.239 But the deeper problem lies in the nature of
the analysis. Agencies rarely offer a deep account of the why of
their approach to enforcement.240 Yet such a qualitative explanation is essential to meaningful debate over enforcement policy. Transparency about agencies’ policy choices would also
enable Congress (and the public) to assess agency performance
for consistency with the agency’s own articulated goals. Instead, performance typically is assessed in quantitative terms.
Not only does that focus discourage meaningful disclosure, but
it also affects enforcement itself: Knowing that they will have to
sing for their supper at the end of the fiscal year, agencies may
shape enforcement policy in ways designed to produce good
numbers.241
B. State Enforcement: Elections
Compared to the federal model, enforcement at the state
level has a more direct link to the people: enforcer elections.
Forty-three state attorneys general are elected, typically serving four-year terms.242 In seven states, AGs are appointed (either by the governor, the legislature, or—in one state—the
supreme court).243
236

Lemos & Minzner, supra note 108, at 876–77.
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103–62,§ 1115, 107 Stat. 285, 287 (1993).
238
See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 108, at 881–83 (discussing emphasis on
financial recoveries).
239
See generally Velikonja, supra note 235 at 932–57 (analyzing the SEC’s
reported statistics).
240
Cf. Kim, supra note 12, at 40 (noting that substantive shifts in OCR enforcement policy were not revealed in the agency’s annual reports).
241
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?,
NAT’L L.J., Dec. 3, 2012, at 23, 23 (“By bringing many actions and settling them
cheaply, [the SEC] can point to an increase in the aggregate penalties collected . . . . This may impress Congress, but from a deterrence perspective, it is
similar to issuing modest parking tickets for major frauds.”).
242
NAAG, supra note 96, at 20–23 tbl.2-1.
243
Id.
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Elections have not always been the norm for enforcers in
the states. In the post-Revolutionary period, most state AGs
were appointed rather than elected.244 The trend toward AG
elections has its roots in the same forces that produced judicial
elections in many states: an initial impulse to render certain
officials independent from other parts of government, followed
by a more populist emphasis on popular election as a means of
accountability.245 Yet, while judicial elections are the subject
of near-constant debate and concern, elections for the states’
chief law-enforcement officers have drawn far less attention.246
Although AG elections create the potential for meaningful
accountability for state enforcement policy, there are reasons
to fear that the effect is more theoretical than real.247 Media
coverage of AG races is patchy at best, and candidates themselves rarely offer anything more than a superficial glimpse of
their plans for enforcement.248 Instead, campaigns tend to fo244
See JEWELL C. PHILLIPS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 205 (1954)
(describing the shift from appointment to election).
245
See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2451
(2006) (“[T]he states’ purpose [in moving to AG elections] was to weaken the power
of a central chief executive and further an intrabranch system of checks and
balances.”).
246
Cf. Richman, supra note 20, at 961 n.73 (noting that “we are far less
ambivalent about the election of prosecutors than we are about the election of
judges” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For discussions of AG elections, see,
for example, Talis Colberg, Election of an Attorney General, 36 ALASKA BAR RAG 3
(2012) (defending AG elections as a means of promoting stability in the states’
departments of law); see also Marshall, supra note 245, at 2448 (arguing that “the
divided executive model can foster an intrabranch system of checks and balances
without undercutting the ability of the executive branch to function effectively”).
247
Criminal-law scholars have raised similar complaints about prosecutor
elections. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 961 (“District attorneys’ electoral contests
are rarely measured assessments of a prosecutor’s overall performance. At best,
campaign issues boil down to boasts about conviction rates, a few high-profile
cases, and maybe a scandal.”); Wright, supra note 20, at 582–83 (“Incumbents
and challengers have little to say about the overall pattern of outcomes that
attorneys in the office produce or the priorities of the office. The debates do not
pick up genuine ideological differences among candidates; they are misguided
attempts to measure non-ideological competence.”).
248
To take just a few examples: California AG Kamala Harris’s 2014 reelection
campaign website listed top issues as follows: “Fighting for the Environment,”
“Fighting Human Trafficking,” “Fighting for Equality,” “Fighting for California
Homeowners,” “Fighting Transnational Gangs.” Issues, KAMALA HARRIS 2014,
https://web.archive.org/web/20140528111539/http://kamalaharris.org/is
sues/ [https://perma.cc/5HD7-F3X3]. Candidate for Connecticut AG Martha
Dean stated that, if elected, her first line of attack would be to “work with the state
agencies to ensure that the laws are being followed.” Dirk Perrefort, Differences
Stand Out in AG Debate, GREENWICH TIME (Oct. 11, 2010) http://www.greenwich
time.com/news/article/Differences-stand-out-in-AG-debate-699318.php
[https://perma.cc/L3WK-8U23. Dean’s opponent (and the ultimate winner)
George Jepsen announced that he would focus on “an assault weapons ban,
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cus on candidates’ personal characteristics, including their
partisan bona fides.249
Part of the problem is that AGs are responsible for much
more beyond civil enforcement. They also offer opinions on
proposed legislation, represent state entities and officers in a
defensive capacity, handle criminal prosecutions, supervise
charitable trusts—and more.250 Given those diverse responsibilities, it is understandable that most substantive policy discussions in AG elections are cast at a high level of generality
rather than outlining what, precisely, the candidates propose
to do with enforcement.
Enforcement, moreover, is likely to be a relatively low-salience issue for most voters.251 That is perhaps particularly true
protecting a woman’s right to choose, open space protection, energy issues, consumer protection issues, health care - for instance, reining in HMOs.” Macklin
Reid, Jepsen Seeks AG’s Job, RIDGEFIELD PRESS, Jan. 14, 2010, at 1A, 24A. When
first campaigning for the job, North Carolina AG Roy Cooper stated that his “No. 1
priority” was fighting crime. Dennis Patterson, Attorney General Hopefuls Would
Switch Roles - Democratic Senator Wants to Enforce Laws He Helped Write, and
GOP Lawyer Who Helped Sue State Wants to Defend It, HERALD-SUN, Oct. 5., 2000,
at C9. When Cooper ran for reelection four years later, his opponent described his
own “top priority” as “[t]ruth and justice. I want to tell the truth to the people and
seek justice.” Matthew Eisley, Candidates Differ on Top-Lawyer Role, NEWS &
OBSERVER, Aug. 14, 2004, at B1. Sam Houston, a 2014 candidate for the Texas
AG’s Office, promised voters that he would “move away from large lawsuits that
garner political headlines and instead focus on school funding, consumer protection and transparency.” Bianca Montes, Democratic Attorney General Candidate
Wants to Take Politics Out of the Office, VICTORIA ADVOC. (May 27, 2014), https://
www.victoriaadvocate.com/news/2014/may/27/sam_houston_bm_052814_24
0712/ [https://perma.cc/HTK6-2VZA].
249
See, e.g., John Cahill, John Cahill - “Tough,” YOUTUBE (Aug. 20. 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IAl3o8XCyBs [https://perma.cc/7ZWWP57N] (“A lot of people call me tough. I served as Governor Pataki’s right hand in
rebuilding Ground Zero. I helped lead the battle to preserve over a million acres of
open space. And we won.”); Maura Healey, Maura Healey for Attorney General,
YOUTUBE (June 13, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXVtsQJpb68
[https://perma.cc/6L98-54ZM] (“This successful underdog works hard and fights
with passion.”); Maura Healey, Maura Healey’s First Television Ad: “Hoops,” YOUTUBE (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovcTjDnL0Ro [https:/
/perma.cc/6L98-54ZM] (“When you’re a 5’4’’ pro basketball player you learn to
take on the big guys.”); John Miller, John Miller for Attorney General, YouTube
(May 2, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w9fqqwf6YCg [https://
perma.cc/8J3J-RHRB] (“My wife and I moved to Winchester in 1981 and have
raised three fabulous kids, all of whom went to Winchester High School and
Massachusetts University.”).
250
See generally NAAG, supra note 96.
251
See Editorial, Attorneys General For Sale, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014) (http:/
/nyti.ms/1F5BaR1) [https://perma.cc/KST7-2KK7] (describing the AG’s position
as “relatively low-profile”); cf. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, The Subterranean Counterrevolution: The Supreme Court, The Media, and Litigation Retrenchment (on file with author) (showing that the public pays far more attention to
changes in substantive law than to changes in private enforcement regimes, and
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of civil enforcement, and even more particularly true of general
enforcement policy. If the average citizen pays attention to civil
enforcement matters, it is likely to be in the context of a few
big-ticket cases rather than abstract theories about how best to
optimize deterrence.252 Yet the cases that capture voters’ attention are unlikely to reflect the reality of what enforcers actually do on a day-to-day basis.
These challenges are compounded by the structure of
states’ plural executives. Perhaps the oldest justification for a
unitary executive is to enhance accountability by consolidating
authority in a single representative.253 That view suggests that
the multiplicity of elected state officers may make it difficult for
citizens to identify, and hold accountable, the responsible officials. This is a general point about plural executives, not limited to enforcement. But the problem may be especially stark
in the enforcement context, which combines a low-salience issue with an especially confusing set of institutional structures.
AGs’ enforcement powers derive from a complicated mix of
constitutional, statutory, and common law authority. The prevailing rule under the common law was that the AG had both
“the duty and the exclusive right to represent [state] governments and their agencies and officers.”254 Some state constitutions and statutes codify that rule, investing the AG with
presumptive authority to control litigation on behalf of the
state.255 Other states made a conscious break from the common law approach in the period after the American revolution,
moving toward a more fragmented system in which state agencies are permitted to hire their own attorneys, or the Governor

more attention to legislative politics than to the consequences of case-by-case
decision making).
252
Cf. Bibas, supra note 20, at 983–84 (arguing that the “political check [of
prosecutor elections] is not working” because “[v]oters, swayed by the availability
heuristic, are focusing on memorable but unrepresentative stories. Many news
stories and campaign ads emphasize a head prosecutor’s success or failure in a
few high-profile criminal cases.”).
253
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 476–77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
254
Robert Morgan, The Office of the Attorney General, 2 N.C. CENT. L.J. 165,
167 (1970).
255
See NAAG, supra note 96, at 83 (“The Attorney General is typically charged,
by Constitution or statute, with representing the state in all cases in which the
state has an interest, in all courts of the state and in federal courts.”).
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is empowered to appoint them.256 And in some states, control
over litigation resides in the Governor, not the AG.257
Even in states that follow the common law tradition of
centralizing litigation authority in the AG’s office, the AG’s role
varies by subject matter. In some areas—consumer protection
is a common example—the AG is the primary enforcement authority, the first mover.258 In other areas, the AG handles the
legal work of enforcement on behalf of “client” agencies.259 The
AG’s control over enforcement policy is necessarily diminished
in such circumstances, and it is subject to statutory limitations
and exceptions. In Arkansas, for example, the AG represents
state agencies only if the agencies so request.260 Several states
vest authority for environmental enforcement in a specialized
agency rather than the AG.261 Other states exempt civil rights
litigation from the AGs’ general purview, while still others have
carve-outs for antitrust.262 And AGs’ control of in-court litigation may be significantly more robust than their control of
purely administrative enforcement.
States also differ on the question of whose judgment
prevails in cases of conflict between the AG and client agencies
(some of which may themselves be headed by elected officials).
Some states give the AG the final word; others reason that the
AG-agency relationship is one of attorney and client, meaning

256
See National Ass’n of Attorneys General Committee on the Office of the
Attorney General, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 272 (1971)
[hereafter NAAG Report]; see Morgan, supra note 254, at 167 (“Today the states
are split into several groups with some states continuing to give the Attorneys
General exclusive power to represent State agencies and others allowing these
agencies to hire their own attorneys.”).
257
See, e.g., State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 663 P.2d 718 (Okla.
1982) (noting that the AG must seek the Governor’s permission to initiate a suit);
see also Marshall, supra note 245 at 2461 (“[I]n a few states, not only is the
Attorney General prohibited from initiating actions without the Governor’s approval, but the Governor can also compel the Attorney General to prosecute an
action even when the Attorney General does not want to proceed.”).
258
NAAG, supra note 96, at 233.
259
Id. at 83.
260
Ark. Code Ann. § 25-16-702(a) (2016); see NAAG Report, supra note 256,
at 285 (“In Arkansas, a department head may request the Attorney General’s
assistance in litigation, or may use the agency’s own attorneys. A similar situation exists in Kentucky, where the Attorney General handles all litigation for some
agencies and some litigation for others.”).
261
NAAG, supra note 96, at tbl.6-1; see also NAAG Report, supra note 256, at
276 (noting that agencies concerned with natural resources or conservation often
are authorized to hire their own attorneys rather than relying on the AG’s legal
services).
262
NAAG, supra note 96, at tbl.6-1.
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that the agency is the principal.263 Complicating matters further, some courts distinguish between different kinds of actions, holding that the AG assumes the role of a conventional
attorney when representing a state entity on certain kinds of
claims but not others, or when the AG represents an officer or
entity in a defensive capacity but not when she initiates suit on
behalf of the state.264
All of this complexity would make it difficult for citizens to
assign responsibility for enforcement policy even if, contrary to
fact, candidates were trying to convey clear messages about
enforcement and the media were picking up and disseminating
those messages to voters. When multiple officials share (or
appear to share) responsibility for a common goal, they have
incentives to shift blame when things go poorly, or grab credit
when things go well. Those incentives are amplified by partisan conflicts. Independent AG elections create scenarios in
which an AG from one party must represent an agency that is
controlled by a governor from the opposing party.265 Even relatively engaged and informed citizens may find it challenging—
to put it mildly—to identify which elected officials are responsible for the resulting enforcement policies.266
These obstacles are not going away. But states need not
abandon the model of the plural executive in order to improve
the prospects for meaningful accountability in the context of
263
See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1981)
(holding that the AG is bound by the principles of the attorney-client relationship
to represent the interests of the state agency “client”).
264
Compare, e.g., Tice v. Dep’t of Transp., 312 S.E.2d 241, 246 (N.C. 1984)
(holding, in the context of a suit against a state entity for money damages, that the
AG “is bound by the traditional rule governing the attorney-client relationship,
and cannot enter a consent judgment without the consent of the entity represented,” but distinguishing “situations in which the Attorney General is prosecuting an appeal or in which he brings an action on behalf of the State,” in which
cases the AG “has control of the action and may settle it when he determines that
it is in the best interest of the State to do so”), with Hendon v. N.C. State Bd. of
Elections, 633 F. Supp. 454, 459 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (“Tice and the cases it relies on
involve settlements of money matters, property rights and other quasi-private
rights of state agencies, which the legislature has no doubt entrusted to the
authority and discretion of an agency. The instant case, however, involves the
constitutionality of a state statute and this can hardly be said to be a matter
which the legislature has entrusted to the authority and discretion of appointed
officials to the exclusion of its chief constitutional legal authority.”).
265
See, e.g., Patrick C. McGinley, Separation of Powers, State Constitutions &
the Attorney General: Who Represents the State?, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 721, 722–23
(1997) (describing political struggles between the West Virginia AG and other
elected officials).
266
See MANIN, supra note 24, at 180 (emphasizing the need for voters to “be
able clearly to assign responsibility” as a prerequisite to effective electoral
accountability).
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enforcement. There is far more that AGs themselves can do to
inform the public about their enforcement policies—not just at
election time, but throughout their terms in office. For example, North Carolina AG (and gubernatorial candidate) Roy
Cooper’s website describes his “top priorities” as follows:
His priorities are fighting crime and fraud and providing
the right information for people to make smart decisions
about their safety and their money.
The crime fight includes tougher laws, like stricter punishment for drug dealers who make meth. It means better
resources for investigators, like more use of DNA evidence.
Protecting consumers means going after scam artists
who trick people into bad deals like risky loans or telemarketing swindles.
Public protection also means taking care of the state’s
most vulnerable residents, such as seniors in long-term care
and children at school.267

Cooper is to be commended for providing any information
about his priorities; many AGs do not. But Cooper’s list is
articulated at a level of abstraction that provides virtually no
concrete guidance about how he proposes to allocate his office’s scarce resources, or manage tradeoffs between competing
enforcement opportunities.
Citizens who want to find out more about Cooper’s enforcement initiatives will find little joy on the AG’s website. Under
the heading of “news and events,” Cooper’s website contains a
link to “publications and documents,” which proves to be a list
of 356 documents listed in no apparent order, and including
consent decrees, affidavits, exhibits, and complaints.268
The people are entitled to expect more from their lawyers.
As we have seen, information about public policy is essential to
any meaningful system of accountability. At the very least,
such information is necessary to effective elections. But transparency about what enforcers are doing in the people’s name is
important in its own right, not only “as a preliminary to the
267
Top Issues, N.C. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.ncdoj.gov/Top-Issues.aspx
[https://perma.cc/BQU4-AKXR].
268
Related Information, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://
www.ncdoj.gov/getdoc/a74eba54-b9bf-45e9-9991-7468c59c9fc3/Related-Infor
mation.aspx[https://perma.cc/64JT-7B7Z]. Again, Cooper is hardly an outlier in
this respect. For example, Texas AG Ken Paxton’s website provides a list of major
antitrust and consumer protection lawsuits and settlements, but specifies that
the list represents “just a small portion” of all enforcement actions; no information
is available about the rest. Major Lawsuits & Settlements, ATT’Y GEN.TEXAS,
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/consumer/lawsuits.php [https://perma.
cc/UG4W-LKPR].
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sanctioning of an agent.”269 As Jeremy Waldron has observed,
“[i]n a democracy, the accountable agents of the people owe the
people an account of what they have been doing, and a refusal
to provide this is simple insolence.”270
C. Public Participation
The discussion thus far has focused on formal accountability mechanisms: direct oversight of enforcement via elections,
and indirect oversight by elected officials. Yet democratic theory long has stressed the importance of additional, more informal, opportunities for exchange between government and the
governed.271 These informal mechanisms reinforce, and fill the
gaps between, elections and indirect political controls.272
Consistent with this view, concerns about accountability
have led to an increasing emphasis on public participation in
agencies’ regulatory processes.273 Opportunities for public engagement range from petitioning for new rules, to participating
in rule-formation (whether through negotiated rulemaking, advisory committees, or notice-and-comment processes), to challenging rules once they are promulgated.274 In theory, at least,
public participation generates useful information for regulators, facilitates public deliberation over administrative policy,
and helps ensure that regulation is responsive to the needs of
diverse stakeholders.275
The public’s role in enforcement is significantly more limited. Some agencies are required by statute to publish proposed settlements or consent decrees and to provide an
opportunity for public comment. For example, the Tunney
269

Waldron, supra note 27, at 17–18.
Id. at 27.
271
See, e.g., Urbinati & Warren, supra note 26, at 392 (noting “the many ways
in which citizens of contemporary democracies can push their interests onto the
political agenda in addition to voting, owing to the porous design of liberal
democracies”).
272
See MULGAN, supra note 24, at 63 (“Beyond the major public arenas of
election campaigns and legislative debates and hearings, governments are engaged in constant political debate with members of the public over the conduct of
policy.”); Urbinati & Warren, supra note 26, at 402 (“[R]epresentation . . . enables
citizens to survey and discipline power holders, not only through the direct mechanisms of voting but also through the gathering and exposure of
information . . . .”).
273
See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 174–75 (1997).
274
E.g., David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and its Implications
for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 11 (2005).
275
See Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63
UCLA L. REV. 1300, 1318–31 (2016) (describing the purposes of public
participation).
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Act—enacted in response to widespread consternation over a
seeming “sweetheart settlement” between DOJ and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation276—requires
that proposed settlements of antitrust actions be published
and held open for 60 days to facilitate public comment.277 The
federal Solid Waste Disposal Act mandates public notice and
comment on the settlement of cases brought by the EPA to
address imminent threats to health or the environment caused
by mishandling of solid or hazardous waste.278 Certain enforcement actions under the Clean Air Act are subject to similar notice-and-comment requirements regarding settlement.279
While noteworthy, these scattered provisions for enforcement-related notice and comment are exceptions to the general
rule. The overwhelming majority of enforcement actions—
whether administrative or in-court civil actions—have no such
requirements for public participation. And, in the absence of
statutory provisions requiring public access, interested members of the public have scant opportunities to learn about,
much less participate in, the government’s ongoing enforcement efforts. Many enforcement actions are disclosed to the
public only as done deals: They are kept confidential until a
complaint is filed in court or an administrative proceeding is
initiated, by which point the parties often have reached a settlement.280 Some statutes (particularly in the environmental
realm) permit interested citizens to intervene as of right in public enforcement actions.281 Typically, however, intervention in
government litigation is difficult indeed.282
276
See Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51
BUFF. L. REV. 937, 960 (2003) (“This legislation was a 1974 congressional response to charges that the Justice Department, yielding to political pressure from
the White House, had granted ITT a sweetheart settlement to a suit challenging
ITT’s acquisition of three companies.”).
277
15 U.S.C. 16(b), (c) (mandating publication in the Federal Register and in
local newspapers).
278
See 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d).
279
See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(A) (2012) (“Before
issuing an order assessing a civil penalty [under the Clean Water Act] . . . the
Administrator . . . shall provide public notice and a reasonable opportunity to
comment on the proposed issuance of such order.”).
280
See, e.g., Fast Answers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.
sec.gov/answers/investg.htm (explaining the need for secrecy in SEC investigations) [https://perma.cc/KUB6-FMVK].
281
E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2012).
282
See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative
Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 508–10 (2012) (discussing caselaw establishing heightened barriers to intervention in government litigation). Intervention will sometimes be easier in administrative proceedings, though
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Even where notice-and-comment requirements apply, they
engage the public only on matters actually addressed in proposed settlements. The upshot is that the public can play a
role in shaping the path the agency has chosen to take, but has
no opportunity for input on paths not taken—investigations, or
legal arguments, that the agency has opted not to pursue.283
Because the details of investigations and settlement negotiations are typically shielded from public view and debate, the
resulting disclosure omits a wealth of information about
agency decision making.284
This point suggests an additional problem with existing
provisions for public engagement: they concern the resolution
of individual cases rather than the formation of enforcement
policy generally. Some agencies—the EPA is again an example—solicit public input on annual enforcement priorities.285
The resulting guidance is often quite thorough and informative.286 The EPA’s new Clean Water Act Action Plan, for example, is a 15-page document outlining the challenges facing
Clean Water Act enforcement, the steps EPA has taken to solicit input from various stakeholders, and the agency’s plans
for reforming enforcement going forward.287
Other agencies release detailed enforcement guidelines,
but do not seek public input.288 OSHA, for example, recently
the details will depend on the particular agency. See A GUIDE TO AGENCY ADJUDICATION 59–61 (MICHAEL ASIMOW, ED.) (2003).
283
See Grimes, supra note 276, at 962–63.
284
See id. at 940 (“This leaves the public in the dark as to conduct deemed
unlawful but not addressed in the remedy or conduct considered borderline but
not challenged by the agency.”).
285
See Markell, supra note 274, at 15–16.
286
But cf. Envtl. Law Inst. et al., BEYOND ENFORCEMENT?: ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE, AND CORPORATE LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS IN FIVE MIDWEST STATES 17
(2003) (arguing that the EPA and state agencies “have . . . largely failed to solicit
the views of the environmental community on high-level issues of compliance
strategy”).
287
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF ENF’T AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, CLEAN
WATER ACT ACTION PLAN (Oct. 15, 2009).
288
Still other agencies make public announcements about enforcement policy
without issuing detailed guidelines or seeking public input before the fact. SEC’s
new “broken windows” enforcement policy is an example. As Chair Mary Jo White
has explained, the policy reflects a theory that “minor violations that are overlooked or ignored can feed bigger ones, and . . . can foster a culture where laws are
increasingly treated as toothless guidelines” and thus calls for enforcement of
“even the smallest infractions.” Mary Jo White, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum, Oct. 9, 2013, https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370539872100 [https://perma.cc/YTX5-5LWH]. True to its word, the SEC has
ramped up enforcement of strict liability offenses. See Suzanne McGee, SEC’s
“Broken Windows” Policing of Wall Street: “Deeply Flawed” or Necessary?, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/04/
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issued a press release announcing a new “Severe Violator Enforcement Program” (SVEP), explaining that the program “is
intended to focus OSHA enforcement resources on recalcitrant
employers who endanger workers by demonstrating indifference to their responsibilities under the law,” and signaling that
the agency also is working on plans to change its penalty policies.289 The press release contains a link to OSHA’s website,
which includes a detailed description of the SVEP, outlines how
the new program differs from the agency’s prior Enhanced Enforcement Program, defines “high emphasis hazards,” and offers criteria for a Severe Violator enforcement case.290
As these examples demonstrate, it is possible for enforcers
to provide concrete information about how they propose to use
their limited resources, and to involve the public in the prioritysetting process. But these examples are hardly representative
of the full universe of enforcement. Many agencies provide little, if any, information about their enforcement policies, or how
those policies differ from what has come before. And even those
agencies that do provide public information are under no obligation to do so. As Richard Mulgan has argued, “[o]nly if the
people receiving the information have the right to demand it . . .
is the relationship one of accountability. Purely voluntary or
grace-and-favor transparency does not amount to
accountability.”291
It is worth recalling here that the benefits of public engagement run in two directions. Notice-and-comment procedures,
after all, not only provide notice to the public of prospective
policy changes but also invite public input. Both sides of the
information exchange are critical to accountability. All too
often, though, in the enforcement context we have neither.
IV
POLICING PRIVATE INFLUENCE
Accountability has both an affirmative and a negative aspect: To say that enforcement (or any other government action)
should be accountable to the public is also to say that enforcesec-broken-windows-wall-street-crackdown-flawed-effective [https://perma.cc/
9ZUZ-WCKE].
289
OSHA NEWS RELEASE, US DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S OSHA TAKES ACTION TO
PROTECT AMERICA’S WORKERS WITH SEVERE VIOLATOR PROGRAM AND INCREASED PENALTIES
(Apr. 22, 2010).
290
Severe Violator Enforcement Program, U.S. DEPT. LABOR (June 18, 2010)
https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=DIREC
TIVES&p_id=4503#XI [https://perma.cc/9XT9-QCYK].
291
MULGAN, supra note 24, at 11.
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ment should not be accountable solely, or primarily, to narrow
private interests. The previous Part focused on accountability
in the affirmative sense, canvassing opportunities for the public to call to account, and hold to account, their representatives
in government. As we have seen, political controls at the federal level and elections in the states create opportunities for
holding enforcers accountable for their decisions. But, in large
part because of the dearth of information available about enforcement—the difficulty of calling enforcement to account—
those mechanisms do not appear to be terribly effective.
This Part takes up what may be an even deeper problem
with our existing treatment of enforcement, concerning the
negative side of accountability. The deficiency of formal and
informal opportunities for public engagement and debate does
not mean that private citizens lack the capacity to influence
enforcement decisions. It means that such influence is likely to
be unbalanced and undisclosed. Part II discussed several features that make enforcement particularly susceptible to private
influence or capture. Yet, despite the manifest need for protection, the tools that policymakers have developed to combat
capture in other contexts are, for the most part, inapplicable to
enforcement.292
To begin with, judicial review has often been described as a
key mechanism for preventing regulatory capture.293 Judicial
review forces agencies to articulate public-regarding reasons
for their actions; it then tests regulations against the proffered
reasons and the principles embodied in the relevant statute.
And, “[b]ecause judicial review is open to all affected parties, it
can operate as a counterweight to the influence of organized
special-interest groups in political and regulatory
processes.”294
When it comes to enforcement, judicial review is significantly curtailed. Courts play an important role in deciding the
merits of litigated cases, of course, but the overwhelming majority of public enforcement actions settle, often before reach292
We have already encountered several of those tools in the previous Part.
That is, mechanisms designed to foster accountability to the public—including
centralized executive and legislative oversight and provisions for public participation—also can be understood as anti-capture devices. See Barkow, supra note
104, at 58–64 (describing “political tools” and “public advocates” as guards
against capture); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 112, at 1361–62 (describing
OIRA review as an anti-capture device).
293
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (explaining how expanded judicial review
of agency action was designed to minimize industry capture).
294
Livermore & Revesz, supra note 112, at 1360.
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ing any court.295 Some courts treat enforcement settlements
as wholly unreviewable;296 others “give only a quick glance.”297
Even in areas where courts are required by statute to determine whether agency settlements are in the public interest,298
review tends to be cursory and decidedly deferential.299 Decisions rejecting agency settlements—such as Judge Jed
Rakoff’s 2011 decision refusing to approve a $285 million settlement between the SEC and Citigroup—make national news
precisely because they are so unusual.300 (Judge Rakoff’s decision was later reversed on appeal as an abuse of discretion.)301
Nor will courts second-guess the government’s decisions to
enforce or not to enforce. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme
Court reasoned that judicial review of enforcement decisions
would be inappropriate because such decisions “often involve[ ]
a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise,” including “whether
agency resources are best spent on this violation or another,
whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the
particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s
overall policies, and . . . whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.”302 The Court left open
the possibility of review in certain narrow circumstances—
such as where an agency has “‘consciously and expressly
adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an
abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”303 Nevertheless,

295

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 494 F.3d 1027,
1032 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reasoning that settlement decisions—“arising from considerations of resource allocation, agency priorities, and costs of alternatives—are
well within the agency’s expertise and discretion”).
297
Farber & O’Connell, supra note 52, at 1173.
298
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012) (mandating review of antitrust
settlements).
299
See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (explaining that the court should interfere with a consent decree only if it
“appears to make a mockery of judicial power”).
300
S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
301
S.E.C. v. CitiGroup Global Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).
302
470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (invoking § 701(a)(2) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012), which withholds judicial review of
“agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law”).
303
Id. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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after Heckler, judicial review of enforcement decisions is vanishingly rare.304
Various scholars have argued for more robust judicial review of enforcement decisions, especially decisions not to enforce.305 Yet it is difficult to envision the Court abandoning
Heckler, in part because enforcement decisions are unavoidably discretionary, and in part because the logistics of reviewing decisions not to enforce are so thorny. The key point for
present purposes is that the Court’s unwillingness to police
enforcement decisions ex post makes it all the more important
to structure the processes by which those decisions are made
ex ante. This Part considers three ways of policing against the
risk of lopsided private influence over enforcement: transparency, election reforms, and lobbying regulations.
A. Enforcement in the “Sunshine”
The previous Part discussed transparency as a means of
calling public enforcement to account, but transparency also
serves a protective role. The underlying intuition is captured
by the famous adage that sunlight is the best disinfectant:306
Transparency promotes accountability by informing the people
about the business of government, while “limit[ing] the opportunities for agency capture and self-dealing.”307 To those ends,
the federal Government in the Sunshine and Freedom of Information Acts and their state-level analogues require, in broad
strokes, that the work of government take place in full view of
the public. Meetings must be open to interested parties and

304
Tara Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 781, 801 (2009) (“Federal courts rarely review individual nonenforcement decisions . . . .”).
305
For a sampling of scholarship critical of Heckler, see Bressman, supra note
176, at 1686 (advocating arbitrariness review); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing
Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Cheney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 675–83 (1985)
(arguing that courts should entertain certain challenges to nonenforcement
decisions).
306
See Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY (Dec. 20,
1913) http:// www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/196
[https://perma.cc/MHL6-F3DS].
307
Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 59 (1998); see Livermore & Revesz, supra note 112, at 1356 (“Because
efforts at agency capture are thought to be most effective when they take place
outside the public eye, transparency is often considered to be an important ward
against undue special-interest influence.”).
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the press;308 documents related to official government business must be publicly accessible.309
“Sunshine” statutes typically include broad exemptions for
matters relating to enforcement and litigation.310 The reason is
not hard to understand: Transparency can undermine the efficacy of enforcement by disclosing sensitive information about
government strategy, or weaknesses in the government’s case,
to the adversary or to other would-be violators.311 Similar reasons support the attorney-client privilege, on which many of
the exceptions are based.312 As one court explained, “[i]f the
public’s ‘right to know’ compelled admission of an audience [to
discussions concerning settlement and avoidance of litigation],
the ringside seats would be occupied by the government’s adversary, delighted to capitalize on every revelation of
weakness.”313
Although these concerns help explain why information
about specific proceedings is exempted from “sunshine” requirements, they do not justify secrecy about enforcement policy and priorities more generally.314 Nor do concerns about the
308
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (requiring that meetings of multi-member agencies
be held publicly). For an overview of state-level Sunshine Acts, see Teresa Dale
Pupillo, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine in the
1990s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165 (1993).
309
5 U.S.C. § 552 (requiring government agencies to provide access to agency
documents upon public request).
310
See, e.g., id. § 552(c)(10) (exempting from open-meeting requirement any
meetings that “specifically concern the agency’s issuance of a subpoena, or the
agency’s participation in a civil action or proceeding, . . . or the initiation, conduct,
or disposition by the agency of a particular case of formal agency adjudication . . .
involving a determination on the record after opportunity for a hearing”);
§ 552(b)(7)(E) (exempting from disclosure requirements documents whose production “would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the
law”).
311
See Mayer Brown LLP v. I.R.S., 562 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he importance of deterrence explains why the [FOIA exemption for enforcement guidelines] is written in broad and general terms.”); see also infra notes
310–26 and accompanying text (discussing concerns that transparency in enforcement policy would undermine deterrence by signaling to regulated entities
that certain offenses will not be pursued).
312
See Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. F.E.R.C., 798 F.2d 499, 503
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Exemption 10, like the attorney-client privilege in civil litigation,
. . . which it quite clearly reflects, serves to facilitate the candid exchange of views
between client and counsel necessary for effective participation in adversary
proceedings.”).
313
Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento Cty. Bd. of Sup’r, 263 Cal.
App. 2d 41, 56 (Ct. App. 1968).
314
Cf. MANIN, supra note 24, at 168 (“[A]lthough a certain amount of openness
in political acts is required to keep citizens informed, it is not necessary at each
stage of the decision process.”)
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political consequences of improved transparency. In a world of
limited budgets and staffs, a full account of enforcement priorities inevitably would entail a discussion of issues the enforcers
are not pursuing. Yet such announcements may be politically
risky. Bromides about “protecting consumers” provide less
ammunition for political opponents than detailed explanations
of the types of offenses enforcers plan to prioritize and those
they expect to ignore. Perhaps this, too, helps explain the status quo; it does not excuse it.
A more promising argument against transparency is that
exposing enforcement priorities could encourage violations by
reducing the perceived likelihood of sanctions.315 Law-evasion
may well be a cost of transparency, but the problem should not
be overstated. As Kate Andrias has pointed out, “sophisticated
regulated parties are typically aware of informal, undisclosed
policies of nonenforcement or prioritization.”316 In areas where
private enforcement is a possibility, moreover, would-be violators would be foolish to rely on agency guidelines while ignoring
the potential for a private civil suit. And even where private
enforcement is unavailable, many offenses are subject to multiple layers of public enforcement by different agencies, or by
different states, or by states as well as the federal government.317 This “distinctively American” approach to enforcement318 often reflects self-conscious efforts by the legislature to
avoid placing exclusive enforcement authority in the hands of
one executive institution—particularly in times of divided government.319 The upshot is that one agency’s policy of nonenforcement may offer only weak assurance that violations will
not be pursued. It will be the rare case, moreover, in which an
agency promises never to pursue a particular class of violation,
as opposed to downplaying certain offenses in favor of
others.320
315

See Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, supra note 12, at 1136–43.
Andrias, supra note 12, at 1098.
317
See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 698, 707–17 (2012) (describing federal statutes that authorize concurrent
state and federal enforcement); Minzner, supra note 84, at 2142–43 (describing
overlapping enforcement authority among federal agencies).
318
Engstrom, supra note 55, at 629.
319
See Sean Farhang & Miranda Yaver, Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 401, 403–05 (2015).
320
See Andrias, supra note 12, at 1097–98 (noting that “a policy of statutory
abdication would exceed presidential power even under existing doctrine and
would also subject the Executive to greater, unwelcome judicial review under
Heckler v. Chaney”).
316
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The risk of law-evasion may be higher in areas where a
single agency controls the relevant universe of enforcement,
and where the criteria for enforcement (or non-enforcement)
are particularly concrete. The IRS’s audit procedures are one
example. The IRS is notoriously close-lipped about how it determines which tax returns to audit, but available evidence
suggests that the agency uses a complicated and top secret
formula.321 Disclosure of that formula could well encourage
tax-evasion by providing a detailed blueprint for avoiding IRS
scrutiny. The risk of scrutiny by state tax authorities would
remain, so long as the states’ audit procedures did not map
perfectly onto the IRS’s. But let us imagine, for the sake of
argument, that the IRS is the only game in town. The important point for present purposes is that a decrease in deterrence—even if substantial—is only one side of the relevant
equation, and must be balanced against the gains in transparency and accountability. Although secrecy may be the best
approach in some circumstances, it should not be the unconsidered default. Decisions to keep enforcement policy confidential should at the very least be carefully weighed, and the
decisions themselves (along with their justifications) should be
as transparent as possible.
B. Regulating Enforcer Elections
Although the average citizen will find it difficult to learn
about enforcement policy, there is one segment of the public
that tends to know very well what enforcers are up to: the
targets, and potential targets, of enforcement. Regulated entities have every incentive to try to influence enforcement, and
AG elections—or, more precisely, the need for candidates to
fund their election campaigns—pose particular risks of lopsided influence. Improving the information available about enforcement is one way to combat those risks. Another approach
is to focus more directly on how enforcer elections are
regulated.
Consider again the commonalities between enforcement
and adjudication—particularly when it comes to discrete enforcement decisions. If we take seriously the Court’s analysis
of judicial elections, we can find support for more robust regulation of enforcer elections than would be permitted for legislators or other executive offices. One possibility might be to limit
321
See Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1068–69 (2009) (describing the audit process and its
secrecy).
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AGs’ ability to solicit campaign contributions from the targets
of imminent or pending enforcement actions, including investigations. Many states restrict personal solicitations from judicial candidates, and the Court recently sustained such
restrictions against a First Amendment challenge.322 Several
states also require contributions to judicial candidates to be
funneled through a committee rather than going to the candidate personally, and kept anonymous from the candidate so
that judges will not know who supported them and who did
not.323 Similar protections are at the very least worthy of consideration in the context of enforcer elections. Alternatively,
elected AGs might voluntarily adopt policies against soliciting
or accepting contributions from enforcement targets, as at
least one has done.324
Rather than regulating contributions at the front end,
states might instead consider limiting AGs’ involvement in
cases involving substantial campaign contributors.325 For example, some states have adopted regulations seeking to limit
“pay to play” arrangements between AGs and private attorneys
who perform work for the state in exchange for a fee, often a
percentage of the recovery.326 News reports had revealed that
the attorneys who won lucrative state contracts often happened to be campaign supporters.327 In response, states imposed new requirements for the hiring of outside counsel,
322
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015); Brief of Amicus Curiae
The American Bar Association in Support of Respondent, Williams-Yulee v. Fla.
Bar, 135 S. Ct. (No. 13-1499) (appendix listing state laws barring judicial
solicitations).
323
See, e.g., Colo. Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.3(A) (permitting nonpartisan citizens’ committees to raise funds for a judge’s campaign, but specifying that
“the judge should not be advised of the source of funds raised by the committee or
committees”); Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct 5(C)(2) (“[A] candidate’s judicial
election committee should not disclose the names of contributors to judicial campaigns and judicial candidates and judges should avoid obtaining the names of
contributors . . . .”).
324
See Eric Lipton, Bipartisan Push to Limit Lobbyists’ Sway Over Attorneys
General, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2014, at A10 (describing policy adopted by Missouri
AG Chris Koster).
325
Cf. Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1
(2012) (advocating, in light of the Court’s campaign-finance doctrine, a turn to ex
post regulation of money once it is within the political system, rather than ex ante
regulation of money to limit its entry in the first place).
326
See Lemos, supra note 16, 543–44.
327
See, e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, The Growing Power of Trial Lawyers, WEEKLY
STANDARD, Sept. 23, 1996, at 21, 22–23; David Hammer, Attorney General Called
Out for Giving Contracts to Top Campaign Donors, WWLTV EYEWITNESS NEWS (Oct.
30, 2013, 7:25 AM), https://vimeo.com/142410300 [http://perma.cc/YD39US3U]. For a more recent report suggesting that the problems have not gone
away, see Eric Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays by Coaxing Attorneys General
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including open bidding procedures and limits on contingent
fees.328
These reforms are important, but they do nothing to address the risks associated with cases in which campaign contributors are parties or opposing attorneys. In the context of
judicial elections, several states require judges to recuse themselves from cases concerning their financial supporters. In
Caperton v. Massey, the Supreme Court held that recusal was
required as a matter of due process when the contributor in
question had “a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the
judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”329 The Court emphasized that due process sets the floor
for recusal, and that states are free to adopt more stringent
requirements via statutes.330 In California, for example, judges
who received a contribution of more than $1,500 from a party
or attorney for an election within the last six years or for an
upcoming election are disqualified from participating in the
case.331 New York bars judges from hearing cases when the
lawyers or any of the participants involved donated $2,500 or
more in the preceding two years.332
Recusal rules for enforcers look very different. To the extent that states regulate recusal for civil enforcers at all, the
existing regulations are relatively weak and do not distinguish
to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at A1 (discussing campaign contributions by
attorneys hoping to secure contracts for state legal work).
328
See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 16.0155 (West 2015) (mandating open and transparent bidding systems and capping contingent fees); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-4803
(2012) (same); Ind. Code § 4-6-3-2.5(b) (2012) (same); Iowa Code §§ 13.7, 23B.3
(2015) (same); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 7-5-8, 7-5-21, 7-5-39 (2015) (same); Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 34.376, 34.378, 34.380 (2015) (same); see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 7537,135(a)(1) (2014) (establishing elaborate procedures for contracts that might
result in the payment of more than $1,000,000 in fees to private attorneys); Tex.
Gov’t Code Ann. § 2254.103(e) (2013) (requiring legislative approval for most contingent-fee arrangements); Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-510.1 (2015) (requiring open and
competitive bidding for contingent-fee contracts).
329
556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).
330
Id. at 889.
331
See Judicial Campaigns and Elections, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign
_financing.cfm?state.
332
Id. Until recently, Alabama judges were required to recuse themselves
from cases involving parties who contributed more than $4,000 (for appellate
judges) or $2,000 (for trial judges). Ala. Code § 12-24-1 (repealed by Act 2014455, p.1688, § 2 (July 1, 2014)). Alabama’s law was amended in 2014 and now
establishes a rebuttable presumption that the judge will recuse herself from a
case involving a party whose contributions exceeded ten percent of the total
contributions in a statewide appellate race, fifteen percent in a circuit court race,
and twenty-five percent in a district court race. Ala. Code § 12-24-3 (2012).
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between elected enforcers and career civil servants.333 Statelevel recusal rules tend to focus on scenarios in which a government attorney’s prior practice might conflict with current
cases.334 No state addresses the possibility of concurrent influence in the form of campaign contributions and the like.
C. Lobbying
Finally, it is critical to attend to the role of lobbying in the
enforcement context. Lobbying regulations typically require
lobbyists to register with the government and to submit periodic reports of their activities and their expenditures. Some
states restrict lobbyists’ ability to make campaign contributions.335 The goal of such laws is to facilitate public knowledge
of a key lever of influence over public policy, and to ensure that
any influence is a product of advocacy and not more personal
enticements.
Federal law defines “lobbying contact” broadly, to include
any communication “to a covered executive branch official or a
covered legislative branch official that is made on behalf of a
client with regard to”—among other things—“the administration or execution of a Federal program or policy.”336 But the
relevant statute then carves out any communication “made to
an official in an agency with regard to . . . a judicial proceeding
or a criminal or civil law enforcement inquiry, investigation, or
proceeding.”337 Thus, efforts to influence general enforcement
policy would likely be covered by federal lobbying regulations,
333
Perhaps not surprisingly, many recusal rules focus on criminal prosecutors, not civil enforcers. And the test for recusal is often fairly demanding, requiring the requesting party to show that “a conflict of interest exists that would
render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” West’s Ann. Cal.
Penal Code § 1424 (motion to disqualify a district attorney); see Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 20-1-107(2) (similar); People v. Loper, 241 P.3d 353, 546 (Colo. 2010) (holding
that it is not enough that “the facts raise concerns of impropriety but do not have
any bearing on whether the defendant would be likely to receive a fair trial”).
334
See, e.g., Ala. Rules of Prof. Conduct 1.11(c)(1) (prohibiting a government
attorney from “participat[ing] in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or in nongovernmental employment”); Ariz. Rules of Prof. Conduct 1.11 (same); Ark. Rules of Prof. Conduct
1.11(d)(2) (same); Del. Code of Prof. Conduct 1.11(d)(2)(i) (same); Fla. Rule of Prof.
Conduct 4-1.11(d)(2)(A) (same).
335
Under Alaska law, for example, lobbyists cannot host fundraising events,
directly or indirectly collect money for a candidate, or make contributions to
legislative candidates except in the district where the lobbyist actually votes. See
ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.130, § 15.13.074(g), § 24.45.121(a), §§ 24.45.041(b)(8), (9),
§ 24.60.030(a)(1), § 24.60.031(a)(2), and § 24.60.085.
336
2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(A).
337
Id. § 1602(8)(B) (2012).
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but efforts to influence particular enforcement actions would
not be.
Lobbying rules are more limited at the state level. Some
apply only to efforts to influence legislative action. To the extent they govern contacts with executive actors, the states’
rules focus overwhelmingly on efforts to influence administrative rulemaking.338 Enforcement decisions, for the most part,
are exempt.
The consequence is that, at a time when more and more
money is flowing into AG races,339 contacts with AGs and their
staffs are almost entirely unregulated. The extent of lobbying
at the state level was exposed in a recent series of articles in the
New York Times, which described elaborate efforts by firms
that saw themselves as potential targets of AG enforcement.340
The influence took various forms, ranging from large corporate
donations to the Republican and Democratic Attorneys General
Associations (RAGA and DAGA, respectively), which in turn
bought access to AGs at exclusive retreats; to direct campaign
contributions to individual AGs’ election and reelection funds;
to draft letters and legal filings prepared by lobbyists and then
used (sometimes verbatim) by AGs.341 At least in some cases,
the influence appears to have paid off. For example, the Times
reported that Missouri AG Chris Koster instructed his staff to
drop their investigation of the 5-Hour Energy drink after talking with an attorney for the company—a campaign contributor—at a fund-raising event at a beach hotel in California.342
In a different case, Koster’s office wrapped up settlement negotiations in a consumer fraud action against Pfizer shortly after
Koster received an invitation to speak at an event hosted by
338
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-25-1(20) (2016) (defining lobbying by reference to
legislation and regulation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1231(10) (same); see also ALASKA
STAT. § 24.45.171 (2015) (defining lobbying to include communications “for the
purpose of influencing legislative or administrative action” and defining “administrative action” in terms of rulemaking or adjudication); CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 82039
(2016) (same).
339
E.g., Ben Wieder, Big Money Comes to State Attorney-General Races, The
Atlantic (May 8, 2014) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/
us-chamber-targets-dems-in-state-attorney-general-races/361874/ [https://
perma.cc/36EP-WA96].
340
See Lipton, supra note 85; Eric Lipton, Link Shows How Lobby Firm Cultivates Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2014, at A15; Eric Lipton, Missouri Attorney
General May Face Inquiry Over Money From Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2014,
at A14 [hereinafter Lipton, Missouri Attorney General]; Eric Lipton, Rhode Island
Investigating Former State Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014, at A11.
341
See generally Lipton, supra note 85 (exposing lobbying practices directed
at attorneys general).
342
Id.
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Pfizer’s PAC, another campaign contributor. Missouri’s settlement with Pfizer was $350,000 smaller than those of other
states that brought similar claims and settled separately.343
Lobbying efforts do not only run against enforcement;
firms also try to persuade AGs to pursue particular enforcement actions, often against their competitors. For example,
lobbyists for the Las Vegas Sands, which donated $500,000 to
RAGA in 2014, have been pushing AGs to support efforts to
outlaw online poker.344 And it is becoming increasingly common for AGs and other government enforcers to work directly
with private lawyers on enforcement initiatives. As noted
above, often those private lawyers work on a contingency basis,
giving them a direct share in any winnings.345
The Times exposé inspired a fluttering of reform, but so far
the effect has been minimal. To the extent that differential
treatment of enforcement for lobbying purposes reflects something other than inattention on the part of law-makers, it
seems to rest on a distinction between policy advocacy on the
one hand and direct client representation, or traditional legal
advocacy, on the other. We would not call a lawyer representing a client before an administrative judge, or negotiating a
settlement with a government attorney, a lobbyist. We would
just call her a lawyer. This complication suggests the need for
care in crafting lobbying regulations in the enforcement context, but it does not justify the near-complete absence of regulation for enforcement-related lobbying. At the very least,
lobbying rules could cover efforts to influence enforcement policy by non-parties and their attorneys.
CONCLUSION
There is a gap at the center of the vast literature on accountability in democratic government. Existing commentary
focuses overwhelmingly on the contrast between legislation
and regulation, on the one hand, and adjudication on the
other. Enforcement lies at the intersection of law-making and
law-application, both in terms of how it operates—bringing
cases to adjudicators so that generally applicable laws may be
343
Koster told the Times that the smaller settlement from Pfizer was caused by
“a mistake made by a staff lawyer that prevented Missouri from joining the socalled multistate investigation of the company.” Lipton, Missouri Attorney General, supra note 340. However, Oregon, which also negotiated a separate settlement rather than participating in the multistate action, secured four times as
much as Missouri. Lipton, supra note 85.
344
See Lipton, supra note 85.
345
See supra text accompanying notes 322–323.
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interpreted and applied to particular individuals and firms—
and in terms of the features it shares with those more familiar
government functions. Yet enforcement has largely been ignored in the literature on accountability.
This Article has sought to fill that gap. I have argued that
public enforcement is a form of discretionary policymaking that
should be understood as a form of political representation.
Casting enforcement in this light helps reveal the importance of
accountability in the enforcement context, while also making
clear that enforcers can “represent” the public without slavishly following popular will. To say that public enforcement
should be accountable is not to deny the need for autonomous
professional judgment, but to insist that it is the responsibility
of government to inform its citizens of what it is doing in their
name, and listen to their views in return. A call for accountability is also a call for mechanisms by which citizens can attempt to influence enforcement prospectively, or “hold it
accountable” retrospectively. And accountability to the public
entails some measure of insulation from narrow, private
interests.
Our current treatment of enforcement falls far short of this
vision. Under existing law, we have few tools to secure meaningful political accountability for enforcers’ policy decisions—
but neither do we have the means to shield enforcement from
improper influence. We can do better.
I have suggested various avenues for reform, many of them
focused on improving the information available about enforcement. Nevertheless, the primary goal here has been diagnostic
rather than prescriptive. As a first cut, the theory I have advanced is necessarily cast at a relatively high level of abstraction. To move from theory to concrete reform, context will be
critical. This Article has focused on the civil side of the civil/
criminal divide, but it has explored enforcement across many
jurisdictions, including the states as well as the federal government. Different jurisdictions may rely on public enforcement
for different reasons, and to different degrees. As a result, the
optimal relationship between enforcement and the public will
may not be the same at both levels of government, or from one
state to the next. For example, the role of the state AG as “the
people’s lawyer”346 might suggest that the scales should tip
farther in the direction of responsiveness in the states than in
the federal government. Or, perhaps, policymakers might cali346

MATTOX, supra note 64, at 88.
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brate accountability measures to account for the availability (or
not) of private rights to enforce the relevant laws. I leave those
questions for future work. Whatever one’s view of the precise
functions of public enforcement, however, it seems clear that
the status quo is far from optimal.

